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The Merchant Marine Act of 1936 established the federal government's policy of
developing and maintaining a commercial merchant marine capable of carrying a substantial
portion ofthe nation's waterborne commerce and performing as a military auxiliary in time
ofwar. Today the merchant marine continues to serve the nation in commerce and provides
sustainment sealift assets and skilled seafaring crews to help meet DOD strategic mobility
requirements. To maintain such a fleet, a highly regulated system of subsidy payments was
provided to shipowners to offset the higher costs associated with the U.S. registry. Despite
the outlay of over $14 billion in aid, the U.S. merchant marine has continually declined both
in numbers of ships and the percentage of U.S. trade carried. This study examines the
development of the Maritime Security Act of 1996 (MSA), and the policy decision to
continue financial assistance in support of maintaining the merchant marine. To analyze the
implications of this policy a comprehensive examination of congressional documents and
industry publications was conducted. DOD and DON mobility planners can benefit from this
study, as the condition of the merchant marine impacts both national security and mobility
readiness. The study concluded that the MSA was a compromise reflecting many interests,
reducing federal investment in the program and requiring recipients of payments to make
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Since the passage of the Merchant Marine Act of 1936, the U.S. government has
maintained an active interest and involvement in merchant marine operations, including the
formation of a private fleet manned and trained with efficient citizen personnel. The 1936 law
first articulated the rationale for supporting the maritime industry, a policy that has
continued to this day. Its premise is to develop and maintain a fleet capable of carrying a
substantial portion of the country's imports and exports and delivering supplies to U.S. forces
in time of war or national emergency.
To maintain and promote a commercial fleet the Merchant Marine Act provided for
government payment of operating and construction subsidies to private shipping lines and
shipyards. These subsidies were designed to equal the difference between cost of operating
and building merchant ships under the American flag and the much lower costs under foreign
flags. Despite the payment of over $14 billion in subsidies since 1936, the U.S. merchant
marine has been in a continual state of decline in terms of the number of ships and the amount
U.S. trade carried since the end ofWorld War II. With the exception of short lived prosperity
during periods of U.S. involvement in armed conflict, the merchant marine has been unable
to compete with less costly foreign flagged carriers. The associated higher cost of operating
ships under the U.S. registry and with U.S. citizen crews forced many U.S. shipowners to re-
flag their ships under less costly registries or leave the shipping business entirely. Today,
U.S. companies own more ships registered under foreign flags than they do under the
American flag.
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As a result of the U.S. merchant marine's continuous decline and the evolution of
the shipping industry to the container age, the Department of Defense has steadily acquired
its own fleet of militarily useful ships to meet strategic sealift requirements, specifically surge
sealift. Surge sealift is one oftwo elements which comprise the strategic sealift requirement;
sustainment sealift is the other. Surge sealift is the initial transportation of troops,
equipment, ammunition and supplies to an area in response to war or an emergency
contingency. Sustainment sealift is the follow-on movement of materials to support deployed
forces. For over 60 years the mission of strategic sealift has been performed by the U.S.
merchant marine. Beginning with the end of World War I and through World War II,
Vietnam, and Korea, the commercial merchant marine has performed both roles of surge and
sustainment sealift in support of the armed forces.
The end of the Cold War and the subsequent withdrawal of troops from overseas
produced a need for a standby fleet of surge sealift ships, prepositioned and ready to deploy
on a moment's notice. Additionally, DOD maintains a backup fleet of militarily useful ships
in the Ready Reserve Force (RRF) to augment its surge sealift requirements. As a result, the
role of the merchant marine has diminished to the role of supplying sustainment sealift, and
the manpower necessary to crew the ships of DOD's surge sealift fleet. Given the need for
the merchant marine to provide sustainment sealift and a ready supply of essential manpower,
the requirement to maintain some form of commercial fleet is an issue that receives much
interest in government, DOD, and industry.
This issue of maintaining a merchant marine was brought to the fore in recent years
as the majority of the last remaining ODS contracts were set to expire at the end of 1997.
Given the forthcoming expiration of subsidies and a growing concern that companies would
re-flag some, if not all, of their ships under foreign "flags of convenience," the debate over
providing new financial aid to U.S. shipping lines and shipyards was played out in the 103rd
and 104th Congresses, culminating in the passage into law the Maritime Security Act of 1996.
In preparing for the 21st century, the Navy has committed itself to the sealift mission,
as noted in from ...From the Sea: "Of particular importance, sealift is an enduring mission
for the Navy. Our nation must remain capable of delivering heavy equipment and re-
supplying major ground and air combat power forward in crisis. Sealift is the key to force
sustainment for joint operations, and we are committed to a strong national sealift capability."
[Ref. l:p. 3] By reviewing the history and debate concerning the MSA, this thesis will
provide a comprehensive examination of the issues, trends, and implications of the
government's role in maintaining a commercial sealift capability to support both international
trade and contingency planning.
A. OBJECTIVE
The objective of this thesis is to summarize the fiscal, maritime, and national security
factors that led to the passage of the Maritime Security Act of 1996 (MSA). The events and
legislative history leading to the drafting of the MSA and its associated resource requirements
and policy implications are explored by examining the various maritime reform bills presented
in Congress during this decade. Additionally, the development of the Merchant Marine Act
of 1936 is examined to gain a better understanding of the events and concerns behind the
federal government's current policy of actively maintaining a merchant marine and the use
of subsidies. The thesis will briefly examine the MSA's affects on maintaining and revitalizing
the U.S. flagged merchant marine and providing DOD sealift planners with access to private
maritime infrastructure, commercial vessels, and available manpower in times of national
emergency. It's purpose is to provide a comprehensive examination of the issues affecting
the federal government's decision to continue subsidizing the U.S. flagged merchant marine.
B. THE RESEARCH QUESTIONS
The following research questions are addressed:
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.
What were the fiscal, maritime, and national security factors influencing the
development of the MSA?
2. Who were the major interest groups involved in shaping the MSA? Who
are the opponents to the MSA and government involvement in the commercial maritime
industry?
3. What were the factors leading to the development of the Merchant Marine
Act of 1936 and the establishment of the highly regulated ODS system? Which elements of
the Act are designed to support and assist the merchant marine?
4. What are the disadvantages to registry under the U.S. flag?
5. What are the consequences of MSA's funding requirements and their
impact on discretionary spending?
6. How was the MSA authorized and appropriated? Which congressional
committees have oversight for the establishment and funding of the MSA?
C. SCOPE, LIMITATIONS AND ASSUMPTIONS
This thesis will examine the background of the Merchant Marine Act of 1936 and the
implementation of the Operating Differential Subsidy System. It will examine the executive
decisions affecting the maritime industry in the 1980's providing the framework for
Congressional intervention in the 1990's. It then follows the Maritime Security Act of 1996
from its introduction in the 103rd Congress through its passage in 1996, detailing the issues
of maritime policy reform and its implications for both economic security and national
defense.
The nation's maritime industry comprises many elements and various interest groups,
making the issue of policy reform quite complex. Over the course of history, the federal
government has attempted to develop one policy that meets the concerns of customer
shippers, domestic vessel operators, international vessel operators, subsidized and
unsubsidized carriers, shipyards and labor. For the purposes of this thesis, the subject of
maritime policy reform will focus on international carriers and vessel operating assistance
programs. The views of the various external interests associated with vessel financial
assistance programs will be addressed to highlight the complexity of any change to existing
maritime policies and how they may affect the entire value chain of industry. Additionally,
the structure of the international shipping community is briefly summarized to convey the
current operating environment in which U.S. ships operate. The use of commercial sealift
for sustaining military operations is addressed as it relates to the U.S. merchant marine, and
does not discuss operating agreements with NATO countries and Effective U.S. Controlled
(EUSC) ships.
D. METHODOLOGY
The thesis will examine the many factors influencing the development of the MSA.
Supporting data for the study was obtained through a comprehensive search of congressional
hearings and reports, Maritime Administration publications, GAO Reports, government
publications, books, maritime industry periodicals, legislative periodicals, and newspapers.
Interviews were conducted with knowledgeable government and industry officials to gain a
better understanding of the issues and concerns affecting the MSA, U.S. -flag merchant
marine operations, and the international shipping industry.
E. ORGANIZATION
Chapter II, "Maritime Policy and Subsidy Background," will examine the development
of and reasons for the Merchant Marine Act of 1936, and provides the historical background
for government involvement in the maritime industry. It also provides background on the
policy tools used to assist the merchant marine, with an explanation of the current ODS
system, and the need for maritime reform and the national security sealift policy.
Chapter III, "Maritime Subsidy Reform 1980-1992," addresses the decision by the
Reagan Administration to reduce government expenditures in support of the U.S. maritime
industry and the impact of the Persian Gulf War on Congress and the formulation of a
follow-on policy to ODS.
Chapter IV, "The Maritime Security Act of 1996," examines the various maritime
reform bills presented in the 103rd and 104th Congresses, and the actions of Congress with
respect to each It then details the passage of the MSA and its various policy elements.
Chapter V, "Analysis of the Maritime Security Act," discusses the fiscal impact and
national security benefits ofthe MSA. The impact of the MSA on industry is examined, with
a summary of significant recent events in the industry.
Chapter VI, "Summary and Conclusion," summarizes the evolution of the MSA and
the analysis provided in the previous chapters. Follow-on proposals for the MSA are
addressed and areas for further research are offered.

H. MARITIME POLICY AND SUBSIDY BACKGROUND
A. INTRODUCTION
The United States, a nation historically and increasingly dependent on the sea, has
long possessed some form of a capable and reliable merchant marine fleet that has served a
vital role in both commerce and wartime. As the largest trading nation and owners of the
most militarily capable armed forces in the world, the importance of an efficient, reliable and
competitive maritime industry and merchant marine has never escaped policy makers of the
federal government. The importance of a U.S. merchant marine to both commerce and
defense has been long been codified in both public law and national security policy. Yet
despite the public policy of fostering and developing a strong merchant marine for these
purposes, the U.S. merchant marine has descended to its lowest levels both in terms of the
numbers of ships and percentage of U.S. trade carried, as shown by Table I.
Total Active Fleet, Average Deadweight Tonnage, Percentage U.S. Oceanborne Foreign Commerce
Year Number of Ships Average DWT Percentage ofUS Trade $ Value Percentage ofUS Trade Tonnage
1955 1,072 12,688 33.8 23.6
1960 957 13,945 26.4 11.1
1965 912 15,293 21.4 7.5
1970 764 18,080 20.7 5.6
1975 534 25,556 17.5 5.4
1980 543 34,893 14.4 3.8
1985 401 42, 394 14.9 4.4
1990 367 42,401 15.5 4.0
1995 331 45,773 13.6 3.9
1997 281 45,459 - 12.2 3.3
Table I. U.S. Flag Merchant Marine 1955-1997. From [Ref. 2:p. 12] and [Ref. 3:p. 46].
At the end of World War II, the United States held the world's largest commercial
privately owned merchant marine fleet, as more than half ofthe world's commercial fleet was
registered under the United States flag. This pinnacle of national merchant marine growth
and vitality was reflective of the wartime need for the United States to build a merchant
fleet able to respond to the heightened sealift requirements of supplying armed forces in both
Europe and the pacific, and to keep the sea lanes of commerce flowing freely back to the
United States with necessary resources and raw materials to sustain both American industry
and European allied economies. Today, more than 50 years since the end of World War II,
the United States has remained and even strengthened its lead as the world's largest trading
nation; however, at the same time the nation's commercial merchant fleet has decreased to
eleventh and fifteenth, respectively, in terms of overall carrying capacity and numbers of
ships (Appendix A). [Ref 3:p. 45]
The decline of the U.S. merchant marine, and those of many industrialized nations,
can.be in part attributed to the economic changes ofthe maritime industry over the last fifty
years. An industry composed of nation-state fleets supporting economic nationalism and
sensitive to international borders, has become global in nature with transnational
corporations operating in an inherently border- less business environment. This change in
the geo-strategic operating environment reflects the current trend away from government
regulation under national laws and the industry's migration towards the less stringent
requirements and financially attractive benefits of ship registrations in many third world
countries known as Flag of Convenience (FOC) registries. [Refs. 4 and 5]
For example, a vessel operating under the registry of Liberia, the Marshall Islands,
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or Vanuatu operates with a minimal to non-existent tax liability and lesser insurance costs, has
to comply with less stringent interpretations of international safety standards, and may operate
with low cost seamen from countries such as Bangladesh, Pakistan, or the Philippines.
Faced with the economic realities of operating under the more costly registry of the United
States, many companies have simply folded or switched over to less costly registrations. [Ref
6:p. 1]
In spite of this trend, U.S. maritime policy over the past 60 years has done little to
satisfactorily meet the goal of preserving a merchant fleet and viable maritime base despite
a government investment of direct payments to ship owners in excess of $14.0 billion. [Ref.
3:p.80] The trend of flagging out brings with it the possibility of a minimal or non-existent
U.S. fleet to conduct foreign commerce, which in turn may cause difficulty in manning the
Ready Reserve Fleet with civilian seafarers in times of conflict and a complete reliance on
foreign flag and allied shipping for all imports and exports and for the sustainment of future
military operations.
It is for these reasons that the plight of the U.S. merchant marine has been an issue
of increased concern and debate in the halls of Congress throughout this decade. Faced with
the dilemma of a continued decline in merchant ships, and on the eve of expiration of
previous legislation, in place since 1936 to financially assist U.S. ships, the Maritime Security
Act of 1996 (MSA) was enacted after more than 10 years of formulation and debate. The
MSA, the most significant peace of legislation affecting maritime policy in over half a
decade, significantly altered the way in which federal assistance would be provided to U.S.
shipowners, in hopes of preserving some form of a national merchant fleet that would be
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both military useful and economically competitive in the world's maritime economy.
B. DEVELOPMENT OF A MARITIME POLICY
Much ofwhat encompasses our national maritime policy can be traced back to a 60
year old public law, the Merchant Marine Act of 1936, that today still forms the basis of the
federal government role in maritime affairs. The Act was developed during a period in
which many of the problems facing a large World War I merchant marine in a s. ,e of
rapid decline during an extended period of peace, are still the same ones present today. The
Merchant Marine Act was influenced by the painful lessons of World War I, in which the
United States was ill prepared for the unexpected downfall of world wide shipping, and by
the post World War I abuses of federal financial assistance made available to private
shipowners of the time.
1. World War I Lessons
Prior to the beginning of World War I, 92 percent of America foreign trade was
carried by foreign ships, mainly British (58 percent) and a combination of German and
Austrian (15 percent). [Ref. 7:p. 47] This reliance on foreign shipping had been the
established commercial norm since the beginning ofthe United States, as foreign shipping has
historically been a less expensive commodity than American shipping. Since the
establishment of the first Continental Congress, that fact and its ensuing consequences has
never failed to have been recognized by national leaders. As Thomas Jefferson stated,
As a resource for defense...our navigation (shipping) will admit neither neglect
nor forbearance... this can only be done by possessing a respectable body of
citizen seamen, and of artisans an establishments in readiness for shipbuilding.
[Ref. 8]
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The outbreak of World War I forced German and Austrian shippers to cease operations,
thereby producing a gap in shipping services that remaining European countries and a minimal
U.S. fleet could not fill. The ensuing rise in world wide shipping costs and American
vulnerability to disruptions in overseas shipping clearly brought home the point that the
United States required its own merchant fleet. In early 1914, proposed legislation to enact
a government owned merchant marine to fill the void in shipping and restore the normal
functioning of market mechanisms in foreign trade was quickly turned back by anti-
government business men who bitterly opposed the use of government funds for a public
service. By 1916 leaders in the executive branch felt that the United States could no longer
afford to stand by and hope the shipping crisis would eventually recede. Secretary of the
Treasury, William G. McAdoo, felt at the very least the Government needed to form a
specialized agency to deal with the complex issues of shipping, which up until this time was
foreign to many Americans viewing the world from an isolationist perspective. [Ref. 7:p 52]
Facing the prospect of not enough ships to carry on trade in highly profitable Latin
American trade routes, coupled with an American interpretation of the Paris Economic
Conference of 1916 as an attempt to create an exclusive economic union by the Allies against
the United States, U.S. businessmen reluctantly choose to give up anti government principles
for the hopes of renewed trade profits with government intervention into shipping. The
legislative battle that had begun in 1914 to alleviate the shipping crisis culminated with the
establishment of the Shipping Board in 1916, a federal agency that was appropriated money
to buy, charter, and construct vessels for U.S. -flag steamship companies. The significance
of this legislation was that the United States for the first time had one single authoritative
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agency to manage maritime issues, and had endowed it with funds to face the shipping crisis
ofWorldWarl.
The shipping difficulties of the time were quickly compounded by the United States
entry into the war in April, 1917, adding to the crisis the insoluble problem of carrying and
supplying U.S. troops overseas. Faced with an even greater shortfall of ships, the U.S.
government resorted to reliance on British assets, charting more foreign ships, using seized
German ships, and requisitioning all U.S. flag ships for the sole purpose of sustainment
military sealift. Even an intensive shipbuilding effort could not compensate quickly enough
for the many years of reliance on foreign shipping and maritime neglect. With existing
shipyards clogged with Navy orders, the government had to assume the tremendous start-up
costs of creating its own yards from scratch.
This tremendous shipbuilding effort was barely getting off the ground when the war
came to a quick and unexpected end in November 1918. In two years' time (1916-1918),
the Emergency Fleet Corporation, a subsidiary of the Shipping Board, had laid 1,429 keels
but had delivered only 470 completed ships. Despite the effective legislative efforts to
answer the need for shipping, the embarrassing fact remained that the United States "rode
the waves to victory in World War I on British Ships." [Ref. 7:p. 58]
2. Sustainment Of The New Merchant Marine
The end of World War I found the United States government endowed with a vast
merchant fleet capable of carrying a substantial share of the country's ocean borne trade.
The remaining vessels under construction were completed by the end of 1922, and the
government's merchant marine continued to resupply and repatriate U.S. troops overseas
14
until the end of 1919. By the end of that year normal shipping markets had returned and the
U.S. had to decide what to do with its vast government fleet. To dispose of the fleet, the
Shipping Board offered its ships for sale, but even at bargain prices it could not rid itself of
the vast majority of its ships.
In response to this, and to stimulate growth in private U.S. flagged steamship
companies, the Shipping Board began to assign ships to managing operators, a dubious
arrangement whereby profits were retained by private individuals while losses where
transferred to the government. [Ref 7: p. 61] There were originally over 200 U.S. operators
of ships as companies easily reaped the profits of high freight rates during the beginning of
the post war rebuilding of Europe. With a free capital investment in ships and windfall
profits easily accessible, many operators new to the business of shipping viewed the
operation as a get rich quick scheme and did not plan for future reinvestment or long term
operation.
When the shipping market collapsed in the summer of 1920 due to the over tonnage
of trade routes, few operators where able to survive. As more and more ships sailed with half
or empty loads and the outflow of government funds to offset operator losses continued to
mount, the Shipping Board reduced the number of operators to the point that only 25
steamship companies operating 394 vessels remained active at the end of 1923. [Ref. 7:p. 63]
Although subsidizing the losses of only 25 companies became more tolerable, the operation
continued to be unsuccessful, as losses continued to be transferred to the government.
Again faced with a declining fleet, and fearful of the pre-World War I reliance on
foreign shipping, the Shipping Board began to assign specific trade routes to operators who
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had bought or received government vessels, as part of the managing operating agreement,
to ensure at a minimum continued U.S. presence in specific trade routes. Although many
operators were at first reluctant to accept designated routes, their position changed with
development of the mail subsidy system in 1928.
By the late 1920's, the Shipping Board had invested vast amounts of public funds into
the private companies without in anyway stemming the decline of the fleet. As a new effort
to rescue what had already been invested, the government decided to subsidize the remaining
operators permanently with "mail contracts," a parliamentary tactic to replace the word
subsidy which was opposed by many Democrats of the time. With the passage of the 1928
Merchant Marine Act, the U.S. post office was authorized to award contracts to steamship
companies for the carriage of mails. With few fixed rules attached to the legislation, the
Shipping Board used the Mail Contract Appropriation as a bottomless slush fund to award
maximum payments to all shipping lines.
Review of the contracts by the Black Committee in 1933, a Senate special committee
established to investigate ocean mail contracts led by Senator Hugo Black, uncovered abuses
in which ships would sail across oceans carrying just a few pounds of mail at immense profit
to ship owners. The Black Committee produced a scathing report of an industry described
as a "saturnalia of waste, inefficiency, unearned exorbitant salaries, and bonuses." [Ref. 7:pp.
114-116] Instead of building up a merchant marine for the public good, as was intended by
the Shipping Board in 1919, generous government payments "subsidy piled upon subsidies,"
had only enriched a small privileged group of powerful shipowners.
The Black Committee formed the basis of a movement for reform in shipping policy
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as part of the larger New Deal policy. However, the recommendations of the Black
Committee for a government-owned shipping enterprise generated fears of socialism
that had been associated with the Roosevelt administration's New Deal. Even before the
Black Committee could deliver its final recommendations, President Roosevelt announced his
support for government subsidies to private steamship firms, and worked with the
Department of Commerce towards the passage of a new maritime policy. The policy that
was delivered to Congress by Roosevelt was felt to be a repetition of private profiteering that
had existed in the 1920's.
Congress then added numerous controls, requirements, and safeguards to ensure that
abuses of the past could not be repeated. The law that was passed in 1936 declared that the
United States government would take official steps to develop the merchant marine for both
defense and commercial reasons and would do so with a detailed, complex, rigid policy to
ensure the misappropriation or diversion of government funds for private profit would never
occur again. Many believe that this policy has never reached its intended goals despite its
existence as the nation's official maritime policy since its passage.
C. THE MERCHANT MARINE ACT OF 1936
1. Policy Goals
Since the passage of the Merchant Marine Act of 1936, the United States
government has mandated an official public policy of actively supporting and regulating a
privately owned and operated merchant marine. This policy had its basis in the harsh
lessons learned in World War I and the period following. The words of Title I of the act,
Declaration of Policy, state,
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It is necessary for the national defense of and development of its foreign and
domestic commerce that the United States shall have a merchant marine (a)
sufficient to carry its domestic water-borne commerce and a substantial
portion of its water-borne export commerce at all times, (b) capable of
serving as a naval and military auxiliary in time of war or national emergency,
© owned and operated under the United States flag by citizens of the United
States insofar as may be practicable, (d) composed of the best equipped,
safest, and most suitable types ofvessels, constructed in the United States and
manned with a trained and efficient citizen personnel, and (e) supplemented
by efficient facilities for shipbuilding and ship repair. It is hereby declared to
be the policy of the United States to foster the development and encourage
the maintenance of such a merchant marine. [Ref 9:p. 1]
This policy has been validated in World War II, Korea, Vietnam, and most recently
during the Persian Gulf Crisis. While the merchant marine has served the nation honorably
and effectively in times of armed conflict, enough so to be regarded as the "fourth arm of
defense," it has been unable to sustain any collective level of commercial competitiveness.
Many of the policy tools put into place by the Merchant Marine Act of 1936 have done little
to halt the continuous decline of the merchant fleet despite the up swings of prosperity and
increase in ship numbers during times of international conflict.
2. Policy Tools
The key elements to "foster the development and encourage the maintenance" of a
U.S. merchant marine over the past half century have been the Operating-Differential Subsidy
Program, the Construction-Differential Subsidy Program, the Federal Ship Financing
Guarantee Program — all enacted as part of the Merchant Marine Act, the liberal use of




The largest promotional element of the Merchant Marine Act, differential
subsidies, was designed to compensate shipowners for the differences between higher U.S.
operating costs and those of foreign operators. The Operating Differential Subsidy (ODS)
is based on a "scientific subsidy policy" whereby the federal government, after careful
determination of exact prices, covered the higher costs private operators encountered on
designated trade routes when operating U.S. ships. Up until 1981 the Construction
Differential Subsidy (CDS) was distributed for shipbuilding along the same precept,
compensating shipowners for the higher costs of ship construction in the United States. The
CDS was eliminated as a promotional industry policy in 1981 by the Reagan Administration
as a budget cutting mechanism. [Ref 10:pp. 459-481] Since 1936 the Federal Government
has provided differential subsidy outlays in excess of $14.0 billion (Appendix A).
b. Federal Ship Financing Guarantee Program
Title XI of the Merchant Marine Act of 1936, as amended, established the
Maritime Guaranteed Loan Program (originally the Federal Ship Financing Guarantee
Program). When originally enacted, the program authorized the Federal Government to
insure private sector loans or mortgages made to finance the construction and reconstruction
of U.S. flagged ships. Amended in 1972, Title XI was redesigned to provide direct
government guarantees of the underlying debt obligations, with the Government holding a
mortgage on the equipment financed. [Ref. 3:p. 9 ]
Title XI was further expanded in 1993 with the passage of The National
Shipbuilding and Shipyard Conversion Act of 1993, Public Law 103-160, which authorized
19
the Secretary of Transportation to guarantee obligations issued to finance construction,
reconstruction, or reconditioning of eligible export vessels and shipyard modernization and
improvement. This act made loan guarantees available to foreign countries who decided to
order ships from U.S. shipyards, a change to further stimulate shipbuilding in the United
States. With the absence of orders for new ship construction (no commercial ships were
constructed in U.S. shipyards from 1985 through 1994) and reductions in new DOD/Navy
orders, amendment of Title XI and passage of the Shipbuilding Act were all part of the
Clinton administration's National Shipbuilding Initiative program to support the maritime
industrial base for national security objectives. Under these programs the U.S. Government
insures full payment to the lender of the unpaid principal and interest of the mortgage
obligation in the event of default by the owners or shipyard facility. As of September 30,
1996 Title XI guarantees totaled $2.5 billion, covering 1,933 vessels and 116 individual
shipowners. There are currently 1 5 commercial ocean going vessels undergoing construction
in the U.S., the most since 1979. Additionally, there has not been a Title XI loan default since
1985. [Ref 2:p 12]
c. Cargo Preference Laws
Cargo preference laws have been used as a tool to ensure a continued supply
of designated cargo for U.S. carriers since the beginning of the century. Beginning with the
Cargo Preference Act of 1904, all items procured for or owned by U.S. military departments
and defense agencies are to be carried exclusively (100 percent) on U.S. flag vessels, when
available, at fair and reasonable rates (but not necessarily the prevailing cargo freight rate).
Additionally the Cargo Preference Act of 1954 (PL. 83-664), as amended, mandates that
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at least 50 percent of the gross tonnage of all Government-generated cargo be transported
on privately owned, U.S. flag commercial vessels. In 1985, an amendment to the Merchant
Marine Act of 1936 required that the percentage of certain agricultural cargoes required to
be carried on U.S. ships be increase from 50 to 75 percent. Cargo Preference Laws
accounted for $298 million in U.S. flag revenue in 1995. [Ref. 3:p. 60]
d. Jones Act Legislation
The 1 920 Merchant Marine Act provides that cargo transported entirely or
partly by water between U.S. ports, either directly or via a foreign point, must travel in U.S.
built, U.S. citizen owned vessels that are documented by the U.S. Coast Guard for such
carriage. This Act, more widely recognized as the Jones Act after its sponsor, Senator
Wesley L. Jones, Washington, has proved to be an essential element in preserving the
domestic maritime element and thus eliminating foreign competition from domestic markets.
This legislation has come under considerable scrutiny in past years from
consumer interest groups. They argue that the law eliminates competition, reduces service,
and adds to high transportation costs by disallowing less costly foreign transportation into the
nation's inland water ways and coastal trades. However, the reservation of a nation's
coastwise trade exclusively for that nation's own vessels, known as cabotage, is common
practice among most maritime nations and has been an integral part of U.S. maritime law and
policy since the first Congress in 1789. [Ref. 3:pp. 34-35]
Today 40 industrialized nations have laws similar to the Jones Act, including
most of our major trading partners — Japan, Canada, Germany, Greece, Italy, Portugal, and
Spain. [Ref 6:p. 1] Proponents ofthe Jones Act argue that it serves a vital economic security
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interest by ensuring the uninterrupted flow of vital commodities necessary to avoid disruption
to our Nation's economy and industrial base during an emergency. As the Jones Act limits
foreign competitors, Jones Act vessels are not eligible for ODS payments or MSA
participation.
D. THE OPERATIONAL DIFFERENTIAL SUBSIDY (ODS) SYSTEM
The ODS system has been the single most important, and highly contested, program
in recognizing and offsetting the higher costs that are associated with sailing ships under the
U.S. flag. In addition to cargo preference laws and the Jones Act, it is also the key element
to sustaining a merchant fleet. The details of the ODS system are found in Title VI of the
Merchant Marine Act of 1936, as amended and rewritten by the 1970 Merchant Marine Act.
However the principles and essential elements as originally drafted in 1936 have remained
intact.
1. Eligibility and Requirements
Any American citizen operator is eligible to apply for an ODS contract so long as the
operation of the vessel to be subsidized is deemed to be in an essential service required to
meet foreign flag competition and promote the foreign commerce of the United States. The
vessel to which the subsidy is applied must have been constructed in the United States, and
be engaged in international trade. Vessels engaged in coastwise or intercoastal trade are
excluded from ODS participation. The ODS contract between the Government and the
shipowner may be signed for a period as long as twenty years. Before the contract can be
approved, the Maritime Subsidy Board is required to conduct an investigation to determine
if there is a necessity for this form of financial assistance to meet the competition of foreign
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-flag vessels in the essential service the applicant has applied for. ODS contracts require that
the operator maintain a designated frequency of sailings with a particular type of ship, and
that the ship only be operated in the trade route to which it was assigned. Additionally, the
recipient of an ODS contract is prohibited from operating foreign registered ships and all
vessels under subsidy must be less than 25 years old, unless the Secretary of Transportation
finds it in the public interest to waive either of these rules. [Ref 10:p 468]
2. ODS Payment Determination
Financial compensation under the ODS program is to equal the percentage by which
the fair and reasonable cost to an American Shipowner operating a U.S. registered ship
with a U.S. crew exceeds the estimated fair and reasonable costs to a foreign shipowner
operating the same ship with a foreign crew. The Maritime Subsidy Board (MSB) is charged
with the responsibility to award, amend, and terminate ODS contracts. The MSB holds
public hearings, conducts fact-finding investigations and compiles cost data to perform its
functions.
3. Capital Construction Fund Incentives
Many of the stringent regulations placed on ODS recipients, as enacted in the
Merchant Marine Act of 1936, were designed to eliminate the abuses of previous government
subsidies experienced in the 1920's. An additional program attached to the ODS system to
ensure that Operators would not abuse subsidies for short term profit was the Capital
Construction Fund (CCF). With the establishment of the CCF, Congress directed that
operators receiving subsidy payments must provide for the acquisition of replacement vessels
and additional ships to keep their services competitive with those of foreign operators. The
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incentive to set up and maintain a CCF, which would be used by a ship owner to finance new
construction, is that all deposits made by a ship owner to his CCF would not be taxed as a
part of corporate profits. Additionally, if the deposits are used to construct vessels in U.S.
shipyards the tax liability accrued would be waived. [Ref. 10:p. 479] The financial
attractiveness of this program was eliminated by changes to the tax code associated with the
Tax Reform Act of 1986 which established an alternative minimum taxable (AMT) income
which included money contributed to the CCF. [Ref. 1 1 :p. 162]
4. The Role of Organized Labor
Seafaring labor unions have played an increasingly significant role as the primary
champion of subsidy programs. For many shipowners the amount of money received from
ODS payments under the stringent requirements ofthe program often does not justify the vast
amounts of congressional lobbying for adequate appropriations in the federal budget, the
lengthy ODS application process, and the numerous restrictions to vessel operations. Since
the end ofWorld War II, organized labor has taken the lead in securing government approval
for subsidies. In a sense, the official funds ofODS have become labor's salaries. The original
goal ofODS and the Merchant Marine Act to foster and develop the industry has migrated
to keeping the labor industry intact with generous wage scales that coul e increased as long
as subsidies were not capped.
Today total crew costs make up the largest part of the U.S. foreign operating cost
differential. [Ref 12:p. 54] U.S. Laws and manning regulations (supported by labor) and the
U.S. standard of living are the contributing factors to this differential. The U.S. standard of
living alone asserts the largest influence on the wages of U.S. seamen. Additionally, foreign
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seamen are often exempt from income taxes and most foreign shipping companies are not
required to contribute to national health insurance plans. Tables II and III contain the most
recent wage and manning comparisons of U.S. to foreign flagged ships.
Flag Master Employee 3rd Mate Employee Unlicensed Employee
(Crew Nationality) Wages Wages Wages
United States $11,359 (U.S.) $7, 142 (U.S.) $3,938 (U.S.)
Norway $5, 836 (Norwegian) $1,447 (Filipino) $919 (Filipino)
Liberia $7,109 (H.K.Chinese) $3,417 (H.K.Chinese) $l,504(HKChinese)
Greece $3,083 (Greek) $2,102 (Greek) $1,727 (Greek)
Germany $6, 509 (German) $3,617 (German) $2,945 (German)
Taiwan $5,696 (Taiwanese) $3,097 (Taiwanese) $2,384 (Taiwanese)
Japan $9, 372 (Japanese) $6,1 1 1 (Japanese) $6,754 (Japanese)
Employee wages=base wages (BW) plus overtime (OT). Note: Overtime is variable. These estimates are based
onOTof: Master 20% BW, 3rd Mate 100% BW, Unlicensed 100% BW.
Table II. Maritime Wage Comparisons. [Ref. 12:p. 61]
Flag Modern Container Older Container
Vessel 1 Manning Vessel2 Manning





Liberia (Hong Kong) 18 24
Singapore 21 25
Taiwan 14 17
' Modem container vessel denotes a carrying capacity of 4000 twenty foot containers (TEU's), diesel
powered, and built during the 1980's.
2
' Older container vessel denotes 1900 TEU capacity, steam powered, built during early 1970's.
Table III. Manning Comparisons ofMerchant Ships. [Ref. 12:p 61]
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E. REQUIREMENT FOR MARITIME POLICY REFORM
The ODS program, government preference cargos, and periods of exponential growth
and business during times of conflict have made substantial profits possible for shipowners
over the past 50 years. However, since the end of World War I peaceful periods between
wars have always proven to be the downfall of the American merchant marine. At the end
of 1997 the last contracts signed under the ODS system were set to expire without an
executive, congressional, or industry initiative to renew them under their existing terms. The
ODS system in place since 1936 has come under attack on all fronts as an inefficient, highly
regulated, and overly restrictive mechanism that has not sustained the merchant marine, but
has instead strangled its growth. Many law makers cited the expenditure of $14 billion in
funds over 60 years as corporate welfare that had done little to stop the decline of the fleet,
but rather had again made shipowners wealthy, much like the 1920's all over again.
Shipowners argued that the current ODS system was overly restrictive and failed
to provide the proper incentives or mechanisms to compete with the liberal maritime policies
ofmany foreign registries. Additionally, they argued it was labor that had reaped the benefits
of years of subsidies that had compensated for higher salaries of U.S. seamen. Labor and
the American seaman had the most pressing concern to continue some form of the ODS
system. At stake were thousands ofjobs that would soon be lost if the fleet continued to
decline in the absence of new maritime policy reform and financial assistance Lastly, the
user of services — the customer, led by a strong agricultural coalition, argued that the use of
subsidies and cargo preference laws to keep American ship owners in business only raised
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their operating fees in paying for transportation in both domestic as well as international trade.
With readily available and much less expensive water transportation available from foreign
operators, the idea of keeping a high priced, uncompetitive industry afloat with public funds
was wasteful and has proved inefficient over the past 60 years. However despite the views
of the many constituencies that voiced a concern over the decision to replace the ODS system
with a new maritime reform policy, the underlying concern of Congress was the link between
the merchant marine and national defense and its overall impact on sealift readiness.
F. NATIONAL SECURITY SEALIFT POLICY
The importance for national security of continuing a maritime policy of fostering and
sustaining a civilian merchant marine was further emphasized in 1989 by the National
Security Sealift Policy, which stated,
The United States' national sealift objective is to ensure that sufficient military
and civilian maritime resources will be available to meet defense deployment,
and essential economic requirements in support of our national security policy.
[Ref 13]
In addition to the Department of Defense's (DOD) sealift ships and Ready Reserve
Fleet, U.S. flag merchant ships provide the final element of the defense sealift triad and are
charged primarily with sustainment sealift during extended periods of conflict. What may be
most important to the sealift equation is the role of the civilian mariner, as all national sealift
assets are crewed by citizen seafarers. As the number of ships in the commercial fleet decline
so does the number of civilian mariners, while the reliance on foreign flag shipping for all
imports and exports and possible military sustainment increases.
Concerned that the continued decline of the U.S. merchant marine would have a
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negative impact on defense readiness, Congress ordered the DOD to conduct an analysis of
sealift requirements in 1981. The results of the analysis indicated that the decline of the U.S.
fleet, coupled with the industry's movement into the container age, had severely limited the
number of militarily useful ships that could be called upon by defense planners in times of
crisis. Since then the DOD has accumulated a vast inventory of its own sealift assets to meet
its strategic needs for sealift. However, if ever fully activated, the DOD fleet would draw
its manpower pool from the civilian fleet, and still rely on the U.S. private fleet for
sustainment operations.
In addition to the DOD analysis of sealift requirements, the Commission on Merchant
Marine and Defense was established in 1984 to study problems relating to transportation of
cargo and personnel in time of national emergency and the capability of the United States
merchant marine to meet the need for such transportation. The Final Report of the
Commission on Merchant Marine and Defense in January 1989 was followed by congressional
hearings to review and amend the National Security Sealift Policy.
In 1991, results of the DOD's Mobility Requirements Study led to the
establishment of the National Defense Sealift Fund as a necessary vehicle to acquire and
maintain a military specific surge sealift fleet. Despite the various studies and analysis, it
wasn't until 1992 that the first significant maritime policy reform bill was introduced into
Congress in the hopes of establishing a merchant fleet that would complement and support
the sealift needs ofDOD and meet the competition of of the international maritime industry.
It was under these premises, and the failure of 60 years of ineffective legislation, that the
journey of the Maritime Security Act began.
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m. MARITIME SUBSIDY REFORM 1980-1992
This chapter will examine the efforts of Congress and the maritime industry to amend
and improve upon the Merchant Marine Act of 1936. Beginning in 1981 with the Reagan
Administration's decision to eliminate CDS and not enter into new ODS contracts and
culminating with the passage of the Maritime Security Act of 1996 (MSA), the issue of
maritime policy reform increased in significance and focus as the expiration of existing
policies drew closer and the size of commercial fleet continued to decline.
Faced with the pressure to decrease federal spending coupled with a maritime industry
that remained divided among its own participants as to the issue of maritime reform, Congress
attempted to develop a financially sound plan that would meet all users' needs. Throughout
the entire legislative process, maritime reform was both a bipartisan and bicameral effort that
eventually overcame the obstacles of limited funding, questionable DOD support, and industry
infighting, leading to the passage of the MSA at the end of the 104th Congress.
A. CONGRESSIONAL OVERSIGHT OF MERCHANT MARINE AFFAIRS
The Department of Transportation (DOT) is responsible for administering the
programs and policies enacted by Congress to promote and sustain a U.S. flagged merchant
marine and its associated industries. The office within DOT charged with carrying out these
responsibilities is the Maritime Administration (MARAD). The annual budget ofMARAD,
which includes ODS and MSA funding, is submitted by DOT annually to Congress for
authorization and appropriation. Appropriations for ODS payments are provided annually
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to liquidate the outstanding contract authority of existing contractual obligations and by law
must be provided until their expiration in 2001 . MSA payments are authorized for a 10 year
period, from FY 1996 -2005, and must be appropriated annually. The remaining MARAD
budget is authorized and appropriated annually.
Until 1995 and the election of the Republican controlled 104th Congress, the House
Merchant Marine and Fisheries Committee and the Senate Committee on Commerce, Science
and Transportation served as the authorizing committees for all merchant marine related
legislation and oversight. Since 1981 the House Merchant Marine Committee had been the
only committee assigned to monitor a single industry and had no full committee counterpart
in the Senate. In 1995 the Republican leadership of the House, in an effort to bring the
House Committee system more in line with the Senate, abolished the Merchant Marine
Committee. Jurisdiction and oversight responsibility for all merchant marine issues including
funding were transferred to the House National Security Committee and its special oversight
panel on the Merchant Marine. [Ref 14]
The House and Senate Appropriations Committees fund MARAD and its associated
programs through the annual Departments of Commerce, Justice, and State, the Judiciary
andRelatedAgencies Appropriations Act. MARAD' s funding is further broken down into
two budget functions: National Defense and Transportation. All MARAD programs are
funded out of the Transportation budget function while the MSA is funded from National
Defense.
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B. REAGAN ADMINISTRATION POLICY
The promotional policies and operating assistance provided by the Merchant Marine
Act of 1936 remained largely intact for over 40 years despite the continuing complaints of
industry and government reformers. Notwithstanding previous attempts to overhaul or
repeal its programs, the appeal of the Merchant Marine Act was its comprehensive and
balanced mechanisms to support a broad range of maritime interests. [Ref 15] The Act had
developed into a policy in which all participants of the maritime industry were greatly affected
any time the government intervened to assist one particular group.
The interrelationships between the subsidized fleet, their unsubsidized counterparts,
Congress, the Maritime Administration, maritime labor and domestic shipbuilders became the
largest barrier towards forming an unified industry voice in support of overall reform.
However, the election ofPresident Reagan in 1980 and his ensuing policies served notice to
the maritime industry that continued government assistance in its current form would not
continue.
1. Budget Cuts
The continuous outlay ofgovernment funds to support the U.S. merchant marine had
done little to stem the decline in the commercial fleet, as the industry suffered its biggest
decline in the number of ships during the 70's (see Table I). Upon entering office in 1981,
the Reagan administration, recognizing this, immediately sought to remove government
subsidies from the maritime industry and adopted several actions to reduce the government's
investment. [Ref. 7:p. 265]
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a. Elimination ofCDS
As an easy budget cutting initiative, the CDS appropriation was eliminated at
the beginning in FY 1982, and all remaining obligations were outlayed by the close of 1988.
Presented as a budget action, the elimination of this relatively small program within the
transportation budget function was quickly perceived as a major policy decision in regard
to maritime affairs. Realizing that the elimination of CDS would impact subsidized
shipowners seeking to re-capitalize their existing fleets, Congress hurriedly passed
legislation, coinciding with the elimination of CDS, to permit shipowners to build U.S. flag-
vessels overseas without disqualifying the rest of their fleets from receiving ODS payments.
This was a short term window of opportunity for shipowners, as applications for foreign
construction approval expired in September of 1982. [Ref. 7:p. 278]
b. ODS Buy Out
As many of the existing 20 year ODS contracts had been signed by the
previous presidential administration, ODS contracts could not as easily be terminated. In an
effort to reduce the payments that would have been payed out over 20 years, the Reagan
Administration introduced a "buy out" option in which shipowners would exchange their
existing ODS contracts for accelerated payments over a five year period. [Ref. 7:p. 278]
2. Industry Reaction
The ODS buy out and foreign construction applications were eagerly accepted by
some shipowners as opportunities to gain much needed cash and replace aging fleets.
However, many in the industry viewed these new programs with uncertainty believing them
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to be short sighted and not the policy overhaul most felt was needed. Additionally the
elimination of CDS and the approval of shipowner applications for foreign construction
created an even further division among domestic shipyards and vessel operators, thereby
making the possibility of an industry-proposed maritime reform initiative less probable.
In either case, the realization that increases in subsidies would not be forthcoming,
and that no new ODS contracts would be signed by a Republican administration provided the
most profound effect on the formation of government policy with respect to the merchant
marine since 1936. [Refs . 16 and 17] However, some shipowners believed that the rapid
military buildup begun by the Reagan Administration and merchant shipping's traditional
wartime mission would lead to increased direct government support. This would prove not
to be the case, as the Administration remained committed to the Republican policy of free-
market mechanisms. [Ref. 7:p. 265]
C. COMMISSION ON MERCHANT MARINE AND DEFENSE
Concerned about the maritime industry's shift in emphasis from militarily useful break
bulk ships and small tankers to larger more efficient container ships and foreign flagged
tankers, Congress ordered DOD, as part of the FY 1981 Defense Authorization Act, to
complete a comprehensive analysis of sealift requirements. This act eventually resulted in
DOD's publication of the Congressionally Mandated Mobility Study. As a follow up to the
DOD study, the FY 1985 Defense Authorization Act established the Commission on
Merchant Marine and Defense. The Commission's mandate was to
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"...study the problems relating to transportation of cargo and personnel for
national defense purposes in time ofwar or national emergency, the capability
of the United States merchant marine to meet the need for such
transportation, and the adequacy of the shipbuilding mobilization base of the
United States to meet the needs of naval and merchant ship construction in
time ofwar or national emergency." [Ref. 18]
Based on the results of the study, the Commission was ordered to provide recommendations
for both the legislative and executive branch, and overall industry action.
Chaired by former Senator Jeremiah Denton of Alabama, the Commission conducted
the most in-depth study of the maritime industry since the Black Commission in 1933.
Beginning in December 1987, the Commission studied all aspects of the industry for a two
year period, producing three reports of Facts and Conclusions, and a fourth and final report
of policy recommendations. In addition to Commission meetings, six public hearings were
held throughout the United States to collect the views of all participants in the industry.
The final report of the Commission was delivered to President Bush in January 1989,
outlining a comprehensive plan for a new maritime policy that would help eliminate the "clear
and growing danger to the nation's security in the deteriorating condition of America's
maritime industries." [Ref. 19] The Commission estimated that full implementation of its
purposed plan would add 244 merchant ships to the nation's commercial fleet, which in turn
would provide for a shipbuilding and supplier mobilization base by causing 194 of those ships
to be constructed in U.S. shipyards. The key elements of the commission's proposed $13
billion 10 year plan was the continuation of a deregulated ODS system, and the
implementation of a Procure and Charter Program Revolving Fund for the design and
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construction of modern, commercially viable yet militarily useful, dry and liquid cargo vessels
constructed in U.S. shipyards.
At an estimated net investment cost of $6B, it was hoped that the program would
generate more than $43 billion in Gross National Product, $6 billion in federal tax revenues,
and create nearly 100,000 new jobs in the U.S. [Ref. 19] Despite the recommendations of
the commission's plan, it would be three and half years before the first significant maritime
reform plan would be introduced in Congress, as the Bush Administration seemed content to
carry over the maritime policies of the Reagan era with regard to financial support and the
refusal to enter into new ODS contracts.
In the meantime, the split between subsidized and unsubsidized carriers over
ODS/Financial aid remained. Additionally, labor and shipbuilders weighed in heavily to
ensure their interests would also benefit as the result of any industry policy. This non
consensus only contributed further to the lack of legislative effort, as Congress and the
Administration reasoned that if the carriers were unable to agree as a group on how to tackle
the intricate problems ofODS reform, then there was little sense beginning the negotiating
process or give into the consideration of increasing the program's budget. [Ref. 20]
The most significant problem in devising a reform plan was finding a way to extend
financial aid to the carriers who currently did not draw it and eliminating the restrictive trade
route system without harming smaller, less profitable carriers who rely on it for some measure
of protection. Another problem stemmed from the fact that any plan that allowed foreign
built ships to receive subsidies would hurt the domestic shipbuilding industry. In the end it
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would take the Persian Gulf crisis and Desert Storm's many lessons learned in regard to
sealift to bring maritime policy reform to the forefront of the congressional agenda.
D. INDUSTRY REFORM PROPOSAL
In an effort to renew interest in the debate concerning maritime policy reform
within the Congress, the U.S. -flag liner industry introduced a draft ODS subsidy reform bill
into both the House and Senate Subcommittees on Merchant Marine in the summer of 1990.
The bill was introduced "by request" of the United Shipowners of America (USA) and
expressed the consensus on ODS reform which the U.S. -flag liner companies agreed on.
The core of USA's proposal, known as the Merchant Marine Revitalization Act of
1990, was to establish a new form of 20 year ODS contracts for all seven existing U.S. -flag
liner companies regardless of where their vessels where constructed, and to remove the
assigned trade route restrictions associated with the current ODS program. At the time of
the proposal only four liner companies were eligible and receiving the subsidy, as the
remaining three liner companies either had fleets comprised of some portion of foreign built
ships, operated foreign registered ships in addition to their U.S. ones, or simply did not want
to be subjected to the ODS obligation of an assigned trade route.
The Revitalization Bill eventually died in committee, as the USA alliance disbanded
by the fall of 1990 due to its unsuccessful attempt to simultaneously represent the conflicting
goals of its membership comprised of subsidized, unsubsidized, domestic and international
operators. Additionally, its reform initiative to loosen the U.S. built requirements for
subsidies was fiercely opposed by the Shipbuilders Council of America. While the bill itself
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did not offer any reduced cost to the taxpayer or added benefit to national security, it did
serve its primary objective of keeping the Merchant Marine debate alive in Congress despite
the lack of any formal Bush Administration plan.[Ref 21]
E. OPERATION DESERT STORM SEALIFT PERFORMANCE
The massive deployment ofU.S. armed forces to the Middle East in the latter half of
1990 resulted in the nation's largest sealift operation since the end of World War II.
Concerned that the United States was not fully prepared to carry out an effective
mobilization effort, the House Subcommittee on Merchant Marine conducted hearings in
September 1991 to further examine the nation's merchant marine capability to serve as a
naval and military auxiliary . [Ref. 22:p. 2] While the focus ofthe hearings was on DOD's
surge sealift operation and the activation ofthe RRF, it was apparent that problems in many
areas ofDOD sealift could be attributed to steady decline of the merchant marine over the
previous 40 years. Even though previous studies of sealift and maritime issues had repeatedly
documented this condition, most recently in the preceding decade, Operation Desert Storm
offered the first practical demonstration of DOD's sealift capability and the merchant
marine's wartime role since Vietnam. It was hoped that the hearings would provide the
members ofthe committee with valuable guidelines for future inquires and necessary remedial
legislation to sustain the merchant marine.
Upon the conclusion ofDesert Storm, the House Subcommittee on Merchant Marine
held a second set of hearings in April, 1991 to evaluate the overall performance of sealift
during the crisis and to examine future new promotional policies to improve the merchant
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marine. [Ref. 23 :p 1] Despite the success of the entire mobilization effort required to end
the crisis, congressional leaders remained concerned that the deficiencies brought to light
concerning the commercial merchant marine's role in wartime support would further
hamper sealift capabilities in the future.
The sealift requirements for Desert Storm were met by all elements of the National
Security Sealift Plan. In addition to DOD's own active sealift assets, the Navy activated RRF
ships and chartered U.S. and foreign vessels to move sustainment supplies. As a result of
strong allied and international support and the easy availability of foreign ships on the open
market, DOD did not activate the Sealift Readiness Program (SRP), a shipping agreement
in which U.S. flag carriers committed half of their cargo capacity to the program during
wartime in return for ODS payments and the opportunity to bid on military shipping
contracts during peacetime. The SRP was never activated because of concerns that the
program's participants would lose market share to foreign shipping lines once the US vessels
or their cargo space was eliminated from the commercial trade routes. With the availability
ofmany commercial ships for charter to carry sustainment cargo, DOD established the Special
Middle East Sealift Agreement (SMESA), which contracted for about 30 percent of the
container capacity aboard U.S. commercial liners to transport military supplies to augment
sealift requirements. This plan minimized disruption to companies as it allowed commercial
ships to continue their regular scheduled deliveries. [Ref. 24:p. 28]
The importance ofthe U.S. merchant marine and the civilian seafarers who man it and
all DOD sealift assets can truly be measured by the actual amounts of cargo that were carried.
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Results presented at the second Subcommittee's hearings in 1991 revealed that U.S.
commercial assets had carried the majority of cargo delivered in support of Desert Storm,
as shown by Table IV.
Short Tons/Percent of Desert Storm Cargo Delivered as of 15 April 1991
(Includes both Surge and Sustainment Cargo)
Fleet Short Tons Delivered Percent
SMESA(US Fleet) 951,016 27.6
RRF (DOD) 707,529 20.6
Allied Charter 681,797 19.8
US Charter (US Fleet) 495,209 14.4
Fast Sealift Ships (DOD) 321,940 9.44
Mantime Prepositioning Force (DOD) 164,328 4.8
Afloat Propositioning Force (DOD) 116,328 3.4
Total 3,438,147 100.0
Table IV. Desert Shield/Desert Storm Delivery, [Ref. 22:p. 256]
One of the more serious lessons learned from Operation Desert Storm was the
importance of the commercial merchant marine in providing crews for RRF vessels. During
Operation Desert Storm there was no shortage of manpower for the RRF as the available
pool of25,000 seafarers qualified to operate deep-draft vessels easily met the need for 2,500
licensed and unlicensed crew member billets required by the activation of 78 RRF vessels.
However, according to MARAD employment data, the pool of seafarers, which numbered
48,000 in 1980, is anticipated to drop to below 1 1,000 by the turn of the century, indicating
a possible manning shortage for both commercial and DOD vessels if large scale sealift
operations are ever conducted again.
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A 1991 published report highlighted the potential problems resulting from a possible
shortage of seafarers. The study compared deep-sea seafarer availability versus mobilization
requirements to determine if a mariner shortage existed. Using the same methodology used
in previous Navy analysis of merchant marine manning and that of the Commission on
Merchant Marine and Defense, the requirements and availabilities specifics of mobilization
were updated to reflect new RRF billet data and various assumptions about the man per billet
ratio. [Ref 23 :p. 259] The MARAD-sponsored study reflected shortfalls in manning
requirements by the year 2000, as shown in Table V.
Commercial Fleet and RRF Manning Requirements
Manning Condition 1990 1995 2000









Assumes that only 90% of that pool of seafarers will be available in the event of national emergency, due to a number of reasons such as
health, retirement, or career change.
Table V. Mobilization Availability, Requirements, and Shortages. [Ref. 23 :p. 259]
The decline in manpower reflects the shrinking base of job opportunities as the
number of U.S. flag ships and their average crew size continues to decrease. Additionally,
the aging of the merchant seaman pool, coupled with declining interest from younger
generations in pursuing maritime careers, has a severe effect on manning. The average age
of U.S. merchant seamen prior to operation Desert Storm was 49, and some mariners who
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were manning RRF ships during the conflict were in their 60's and 70's. [Ref. 22 :p. 19]
The lessons learned from Operation Desert Storm reaffirmed the importance of some
form of commercial sealift to support national defense in times of crisis and sent a strong
message to Congress and the White House that some policy on maritime reform would have
to be forthcoming ifthe nation intended to retain its commercial merchant marine. Speaking
at the first Merchant Marine Subcommittee hearing in 1 990, the Director for Transportation,
Office ofthe Assistant Secretary ofDefense for Production and Logistics, Robert H. Moore,
summed up the many contributions of the merchant marine in preparation for Operation
Desert Storm, while noting the impact of its continued decline,
Today, we can rely on the commercial container ships to provide sustainment
for Desert Shield. Our (DOD) analysis indicates that if no action is taken to
stem the rapid decline in the U.S. -flag dry cargo fleet, however, it could be
incapable of meeting current military sustainment requirements by the late
1 990's and, except for ships operating in the domestic trades (Jones Act),
could practically disappear by 2006. [Ref. 25]
F. BUSH ADMINISTRATION PROPOSAL
Following on the heals of the Persian Gulf Sealift Hearings, two significant events in
the early months of 1992 forced the Bush Administration to face the question of maritime
reform. First, in March 1992 the two largest U.S. flag carriers formally announced there
intention to switch to foreign flags at the end of 1 997 in the absence of a follow-on incentive
and regulatory plan to ODS. CSX Corporation, the owners of Sea-Land Service, and
American President Companies, owners ofAmerican President Lines (APL), joined forces to
push the issue of whether or not the U.S. government would provide new legislation to
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provide aid necessary to keep a U.S. -flag merchant marine presence. [Ref. 26]
The other significant event that marked a renewed interest in the issue of maritime
policy reform was President Bush's selection of Samuel Skinner, then Secretary of
Transportation, to become the White House of Chief of Staff. Skinner in turn named John
Gaughn, the MARAD Administrator, to become his top assistant. Never before had there
been an Administration Chief of Staffnext to the President so well versed on maritime policy.
The new Secretary of Transportation, Andrew Card, appeared before the House
Subcommittee on Merchant Marine in June 1992, to outline both the Bush Administration's
new focus on maritime policy reform and highlights ofwhat the new reform bill would entail.
The Administration's proposal was the result of a cabinet level panel established by the
White House to devise a maritime policy strategy. Shortly after Card's confirmation to
Secretary, and Skinner's installation as Chief of Staff, the White House Policy Coordinating
Group created the Working Group on Maritime Policy that included the heads of 17
government departments and agencies. Chaired by Secretary Card, the panel's purpose was
to advise the President on what was needed to meet the requirements of national security
sealift capacity while at the same time sustaining the commercial presence of the fleet.
[Ref. 27]
Along with the Maritime Policy panel, a parallel effort was conducted by the National
Security Council Defense Policy Coordinating Committee to further define defense related
sealift requirements. The results of the NSC study were released to the Maritime Policy
group for consideration in the drafting of the proposed maritime reform plan and essentially
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reported that the DOD required well trained, reliable crews for both government-owned and
commercial ships and depends on the U.S. commercial fleet to provide these crews for
government owned ships. As a result of the working group's deliberations, Secretary Card
introduced the Maritime Reform Act of 1992 (H.R.5627) before the House Subcommittee
on Merchant Marine in late June 1992.
G. MARITIME REFORM ACT OF 1992 (H.R. 5627)
The Maritime Reform Act of 192 was composed of six major programs that addressed
all areas of the maritime industry. The key component of the Act was the Contingency
Retainer Program (CRP), designed to be the financial incentive replacement for ODS. CRP's
purpose was to ensure that commercial U.S. -flag ships would be available to meet national
security requirements while also maintaining a U.S. presence in international commercial
shipping. While the goal ofthe Act was in keeping with the original mandate of the Merchant
Marine Act of 1936, the method of financial assistance to be provided to shipowners was
significantly changed, and many of the regulations placed on shipowners for receiving
payments were eliminated.
1. CRP
CRP was proposed to authorized direct payments to U.S. -flag vessels operating in
foreign trade, beginning in FY 1994. The program would cover up to 74 ships for a period
of seven years, ending in the year 2000. Annual payments would not exceed $2.5 million per
ship for the first two years, phasing down to $1.6 million per ship in the final year.
Participating carriers would be required to keep the vessels in active commercial international
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service under the American flag and make them available in times of emergency to the
Secretary of Defense. Additionally, CRP permitted carriers to acquire vessels worldwide,
operate without trade route restrictions, and operate foreign-flag feeder vessels in addition
to their U.S. fleets. [Ref. 28]
The proposed system of contingency payments differed significantly from the ODS
system in that payment would not be based on a wage differential ofU.S. crews on designated
trade routes. Instead, the money amount would be a blanket payment to the designated
"military useful" vessel for the duration of the contract. Capping payments at $2.5 million
during the first two years, and leveling off to $1.6 million by the seventh year created an
incentive for both the shipowners and labor to encourage productivity enhancements that
could be realized in terms of labor management negotiations and efficient, cost-conscious
operations.
Additionally, because of the $2. 5-$ 1.6 million cap on payments, CRP would provide
financial aid to more ships at less of a cost than ODS. At $2.5 million for 74 ships, it would
cost $185 million in its first year, and decrease thereafter throughout the remainder of the
program. By comparison, MARAD paid out $217.5 million in payments under ODS, which
covered only 53 ships of the total 83 ships involved in international liner trade.
DOT's extrapolation of sealift data from Desert Storm/Desert Shield provided the
basis for their CRP proposal that 74 ships would be appropriate to meet defense sealift needs
in times of crisis, and at the same time maintain a viable commercial presence crisis.
However, support for the decision to fund 74 ships was never fully received from DOD. In
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a memorandum to the Administration's policy group, Assistant Secretary of Defense for
Production and Logistics, Colin McMillan, wrote that DOD would not need APL and Sea-
Land ships for surge shipping and sealift requirements "even in the most demanding scenario."
He went on to add that "the issue oftwo major U.S. -flag containership operators disposing
of their U.S. -flag fleets is primarily an economic issue, rather than a national security issue,
and should be treated accordingly." [Ref 29]
cl Vessel Acquisition
In an attempt to enable carriers to build new, more efficient vessels to upgrade
and modernize their fleets, the Act also proposed to modify the CCF program application
requirements. Specifically, the modified CCF program would permit the use of tax-deferred
CCF funds for (1) ships acquired worldwide, except for ships built in foreign yards found to
be subsidized, (2) lease payments for new vessels, and (3) construction of vessels for
coastwise trades and inland waterways. This was significantly different than the previous
CCF program that required the funds be used for only U.S. shipyard construction of
international carriers.
b. Assistance to Shipyards
Another provision of the Act was intended to increase the world wide
competitiveness of U.S. shipyards, and to offset the effect of allowing CRP and CCF ships
to be built in foreign yards. Financial assistance for shipowners would not be extended to
vessels built in foreign yards with the aid of subsidies or equivalent measures. The
administration's plan also proposed spending $5 million a year to promote productivity and
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exports by U.S. shipyards, and pledged continued support of the Title XI program for ship-
mortgage guarantees.
c. Preference Cargos
The Act would eliminate the three year waiting period before being eligible to
carry preference cargoes for foreign built, U.S. -flag liner vessels, and for bulk type vessels
built after the effective date of the legislation. It would also allow full eligibility of foreign-
flag feeder vessels in conjunction with U.S. flag vessels in the carriage of preference cargoes.
d. Ownership Requirements
The Act would relax the current requirement for U.S. citizen ownership of
U.S. ship owning corporations for any future vessels. This action would allow U.S. ship
owning corporations meeting U.S. citizenship requirements to attract more foreign equity
capital. It would also make it easier for companies to enter into joint ventures with foreign
companies.
e. Repeal ofAd Valorem Tax.
Finally, the Act would reduce and then repeal the Ad Valorem Tax
requirement. Up until this time U.S. -flag operators who elected to have vessel maintenance
and repair work done by foreign shipyards, which might be less costly than American ones,
were required to pay a 50 percent tariff on the cost of the work performed overseas.
2. REFORM ACT FAILS
Introduced late into the second session of the 102nd Congress, the Maritime Reform
Act of 1992 was up against a strict time line for legislative action. Initial hearings were
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convened July 23-24 before the House Subcommittee on Merchant Marine, giving little time
for committee mark up, House passage and introduction into the Senate. The legislative
calender was additionally shortened as Congress adjourned in early August, to convene
election year political party conventions, and reconvened in September for one month with
the session coming to an end in early October.
In addition to the minimal time criteria to work its way through Congress, the Act
came upon several more forces that spelled its quick demise. First, the longstanding industry
subdivision between shipbuilders and ship operators and between the larger and smaller U.S.
flag carriers resurfaced. These divisions resulted from the fact that there was no financial aid
for shipyards in the current proposal and it encouraged operators to procure foreign built
ships. As for the carriers themselves, smaller carriers objected to the lifting of trade route
restrictions, as the larger carriers would now be able to pull their ships into what were
formally protected routes for them. Additionally, the smaller companies were operating 22
ships under ODS that would not be covered under the new system, which was applicable
only to liner services. "Liner service" defines ships which operate in regular and repeated
trade routes calling on designated ports in response to the quantity of cargo generated on that
route. It is distinguished by the repetition of voyages and the consistent advertising of such
voyages. Non-liner services or "tramp shipping" are those in which ship operations are based
on cargo commitments that vary with the vessel's employment and are usually different every
voyage. [Ref. 10:pp. 5-12]
CRP was designed with the concept of subsidizing the newest, largest, most efficient,
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containerships and other military useful ships for the purpose of sustainment sealift, which
for the most part defined ships in the liner service. Most non-liner ships were break bulk
ships constructed in the early 1960's and before, required larger crews, were steam driven,
and considerably slower. Although considerably more useful for carrying military equipment
during initial sealift deployment than container ships, the need for these types of ships in the
CRP was offset by DOD's own accumulation of state of the art Fast Sealift Ships, Maritime
Prepositioning Ships, and Afloat Prepositioning Ships. Therefore non-liner operators who
relied on ODS payments and cargo preference (the majority of which was agricultural and
international assistance cargoes) to stay operative would be on the verge of extinction
without inclusion in the new financial aid system.
To complicate matters even more, the issue ofadequate funding for the CRP proposal
was never formally addressed in the House Resolution. The total cost of the program for
seven years was $1.1 billion. As a starting point, DOT informed Congress that it would find
a way to pay for 57 of the 74 ships in the program, approximately $800 million, if DOD
would relinquish $300 million to pay for the operation of approximately 17 vessels. Senator
John Breaux, D-La, chairman of the Senate Subcommittee on Merchant Marine,
unsuccessfully attempted to introduce the $300 million requirement into the FY 1993
Defense Authorization Bill. Deputy Secretary of Defense, Donald J. Atwood, and DOD
planners opposed the idea of DOD footing a portion of the bill, and counter proposed to
support the measure if DOT in turn would turn over the funding and management of the
Ready Reserve Fleet (RRF) to DOD. [Ref. 29] Secretary Card declined to accept that
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agreement and thus the Maritime Reform Act was dead. At the time RRF funding was
submitted as part of the DOT budget and directly appropriated to MARAD for the
maintenance and upkeep of the fleet. Beginning in FY 1996 the RRF was submitted as part
ofDOD's budget, and included in the defense appropriations bill, even though the fleet is still
managed by MARAD.
In the end, industry infighting and disagreements between DOT and DOD over
funding, sealift responsibility (RRF), and even the need for 74 ships, proved to be the
downfall of the legislation, which never made it out of committee. With the subsequent
election of a new Administration that November, it appeared as if the issue of maritime
reform was finished. With no legislation near completion and ODS expiration rapidly drawing
clear, APL and Sea-Land made application to MARAD in the beginning of 1993 to begin
reflagging portions of their fleet. MARAD did not immediately process the applications in
hopes that the Clinton Administration would revisit maritime reform and the Bush
Administration's proposal. To the surprise of many industry followers, the Bush proposal
was reviewed by the new Administration and formed the basis for what would become the
next reform proposal, the Maritime Security Act.
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IV. THE MARITIME SECURITY ACT OF 1996
This chapter will examine the legislative history of the Maritime Security Act of 1996
(MSA) through the 103rd and 104th Congresses, culminating with its enactment on October
8, 1996. Using the just failed Maritime Reform Act of 1992 as a starting point for the
beginning of another maritime reform initiative, the Clinton Administration, Congress, and
industry embarked on the difficult process of drafting a policy that could be agreed upon by
the many disparate maritime interests and enacted before the expiration of the existing ODS
system. The key elements that secured the passage of the MSA were its minimal direct cost
to the federal government and its appeal to DOD planners with the insurance of both
sustainment sealift vessels and crews in times of crisis, as well as access to the vast
intermodal transportation infrastructure of all companies represented in the Maritime Security
Fleet (MSF).
A. 103rd CONGRESS (1993-94)
With the announcement by the nation's two largest carriers, Sea-Land and APL, that
they would seek approval to reflag 20 oftheir 60 U.S. flag ships, the 103rd Congress moved
quickly to introduce legislation in an effort to prevent the impending decline of the fleet.
Developed on the basis of the previous administration's plan and an industry proposal, the
Maritime Security and Competitiveness Act of 1 993 provided a follow-on alternative to the
ODS system, with less regulation and government investment than previously considered
plans. This plan was then amended by the President's own reform proposal, even further
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reducing the amount of funds that would be required to support ship operators, to form the
Maritime Security and Trade Act of 1994. The efforts of the 103 rd Congress to pass the
legislation would prove unsuccessful as questions concerning the source of funding for the
program caused its demise in the Senate.
1. Industry's Plan
In February, 1993 the six U.S. -flag liner companies engaged in international carriage
presented their newest proposal for maritime subsidy reform to Congress. In an effort to
restart the dialogue with a new administration and Congress, the industry initiative carried
forward many ofthe regulatory relief ideas presented in the Bush Administration's plan only
seven months earlier. In addition to seeking reduced operating requirements attached to a
new subsidy plan, shipowners were also seeking long term commitment from the government
in the form of a 15 year program with annual payments of $2.5 million, indexed for inflation,
for 1 10 ships. The total cost of the program over 15 years would have exceeded $4 billion,
about $60 million more per year than the existing ODS contracts, which amounted to $215.7
million in 1992. [Ref. 30:p. 12]
When compared to the existing ODS system which payed an average $4 million per
year for 53 liner vessels, and the previous year's failed subsidy proposal which woulu have
provided payments of $2.5 -1.6 million to 74 ships over a seven year period, the shipowner's
new plan was not fiscally attractive to either the Clinton Administration or Congress.
However, by attempting to seek enough money to please all six carriers, the shipowners were
able to agree on the essential elements of a plan. These elements would:
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• Allow foreign built ships to be eligible to receive the new subsidy.
• Remove trade route and service restrictions associated with ODS.
• Allow carriers to operate foreign-flag as well as U.S. -flag ships.
• Restrict the new subsidy to ships less than 25 years old.
• Preserve the requirement that subsidies go only to ships owned by U.S. citizens.
(U.S. -flag carriers had objected to the Bush plan to loosen citizenship requirements
as a way to attract investment. DOD had supported the idea as a way to bring
foreign carriers such as Maersk Line- operators of several DOD chartered Military
Prepositioning Ships (MPS) - under the U.S. flag).
• Prohibit subsidized companies from operating in domestic trades.
• Allow foreign built or foreign registered vessels converted to the U.S. flag to carry
government preference cargo without the current three year waiting period.
• Require that subsidized ships be made available for military use during times of
crisis as members of a new Maritime Security Fleet.
The three largest liner carriers — Sea-Land, APL, and Lykes Lines — were each facing
the choice to re-flag their vessels if no action by Congress was taken in the few years
remaining under ODS. The carriers' proposed plan was an amalgamation of remedies to
address their various concerns. Sea-Land, the largest U.S. flagged carrier, had never operated
as an ODS recipient. In addition to its 40 U.S. -flagged ships, Sea-Land also operated over
70 foreign flagged vessels world wide. Although Sea-Land did not receive ODS, it was the
largest carrier of government preference cargo, essentially an indirect subsidy with fewer
restrictions than ODS. The end of the Cold War had decreased the amount of cargo
generated by government shipping and Sea-Land was seeking to replace its lost share of
revenue with direct payments. Therefore, any plan put forward would have to allow the
operation of foreign flagged vessels in conjunction with U.S. ones in order for Sea-Land to
53
participate. John Snow, chairman of Sea-Land's parent company, CSX Corporation, had
threatened that without legislative action in 1993, Sea-Land would switch its remaining
vessels to foreign flags. [Ref. 30:p. 11]
APL, the second largest U.S. -flagged carrier was the beneficiary ofODS payments.
Despite the benefits of a relatively modern and efficient fleet, APL claimed that it needed a
follow on financial assistance program to its ODS contracts, set to expire in 1997, in order
to offset the higher costs of remaining U.S. flagged. John Lillie, chairman of American
President Companies, believed that without the benefit of a new policy to replace ODS, the
U.S. -flagged fleet would be in the process of "orderly liquidation" as contracts began to
expire. [Ref30:p. 11]
The largest subsidized carrier, Lykes Lines, with 23 ships covered under ODS, was
in desperate need of replacing its fleet. With 12 ships nearing the end of their useful lives,
Lykes required the means to procure ships worldwide, and felt that it could not afford to do
so in more costly U.S. shipyards. To stay operational, Lykes would require that the new
policy allow subsidy payments to foreign built ships flying the U.S. flag. [Ref. 29:'p. 1 1]
The remaining smaller subsidized carriers, Farrell Lines, Crowley Maritime
Corporation, and Matson Navigation Company, had similar needs to those of the larger
carriers - mainly the need to replace existing fleets and offset higher costs associated with the
U.S. registry. Additionally, Matson and Crowley, both of which operated in domestic and
foreign trade, pushed for continued regulations that would prohibit subsidized ships from
operating in Jones Act routes. [Ref. 30:p. 12]
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The industry proposal was an attempt to meet the widespread needs of the remaining
operators in international trade. Although the plan was fiscally impossible, given the
restrictions placed on increases in federal discretionary spending by the Budget Enforcement
Act of 1990 (BEA), it did outline the framework for the essential elements that would have
to be included in any follow-on policy.
2. Maritime Security and Competitiveness Act of 1993
Following the lead of industry's initiative, the bipartisan leaders of the House
Merchant Marine Committee introduced the Maritime Security and Competitiveness Act of
1993 (H.R. 2151) in May, 1993. Sponsored by Committee Chairman Gerry E. Studds, D-
MA, and ranking member Jack Fields, R-TX, the bill followed the path laid out by both the
Bush Administration and industry's proposal at a reduced cost.[Ref 31] Under H.R. 2151,
shipowners would sign 10 year contracts making their ships available to DOD in times of war
or national emergency in exchange for annual payments of $2.3-2.1 million per ship. The
payment would be made available to 90 ships and cost $1.9 billion over ten years. [Ref. 32]
In addition to this bill, a second bill, H.R. 2152, was introduced to increase the tax incentives
for buying or leasing ships built in U.S. shipyards. [Ref. 33 :p. 2542]
Surprisingly, the House plan was introduced a week after the Clinton Administration
dropped its support for such an effort. New Transportation Secretary Frederico F. Pena was
preparing to present the Clinton Administration's own version of a policy, modeled after
former Secretary Card's plan, when the Administration's National Economic Council (NEC)
rejected any plan for continued subsidies. The NEC, an interagency group formed by Clinton
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to help set domestic policy, initially rejected Pena's proposal for a 10 year plan giving
shipowners a flat fee of $2.5 million per ship for the first four years, $2 million per ship for
the remaining six years, and, to cut the cost of building ships in the U.S., $200 million to
guarantee construction loans and ship mortgages. [Ref. 33 :p. 2541]
With the continued efforts of Secretary Pena, the NEC and President Clinton anifted
their position on the issue of subsidy reform, and by October 1993 Secretary Pena was
formulating the Administration's new proposal. At the request of the President, H.R. 2151
was put on hold in the House as Representative Studds and Senator John Breaux, D-LA,
Chairman of the Senate Commerce Subcommittee on Merchant Marine, met with President
Clinton and Secretary Pena to discuss the Administration's proposal. [Ref. 34:p. 2807] Soon
there after, H.R. 2151 was modified to meet the Administration's approval and reduced the
total cost of the program to $1.2 billion over ten years supporting 70 vessels. The bill was
approved overwhelmingly by the House (347-65) in November, 1993 and then passed on to
the Senate Commerce Subcommittee on Merchant Marine for consideration. [Ref. 35:p.
3041]
However, one critical unresolved detail of H.R. 2151 was how to pay for the new
subsidies. The 10 year contracts proposed in H.R. 2151 would constitute a legal obligation
of the federal government and thus be considered mandatory spending subject to pay-as you
go (PAYGO) rules. Established by the Budget Enforcement Act of 1990 (BEA), PAYGO
procedures mandated that new legislation increasing direct spending must be budget neutral
and either be offset by an equal revenue gain to the government, or reductions in other direct
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spending. The lack of a funding mechanism forced Senator Breaux to delay moving H.R.
2151 forward in the Senate at the end of 1993 until a source for funding could be found.
[Ref. 36],
3. Maritime Security and Trade Act of 1994
In March of 1994, with the House-approved H.R. 2151 stalled in the Senate
Subcommittee on Merchant Marine, Secretary Pena with the assistance of the MARAD
Administrator, VADM Albert Herberger, USN (Ret.), unveiled the details of the Clinton
Administration's maritime subsidy plan. Officially named the Maritime Security Program
(MSP), the Administration's proposal generally mirrored that of H.R. 2151 with the main
difference being that it would offer a 10-year program to only 52 ships at a cost of $1 billion.
The MSP would also require participants to enter into an Emergency Preparedness Program
that would require carriers to make their ships and intermodal sealift support available to the
government in times of national emergencies. The MSP provided its funding mechanism in
the form of a 150 percent hike in the current vessel tonnage tax.
The vessel tonnage tax placed on commercial vessels entering U.S. ports was first
established in 1790. The tonnage tax rate is based on the Net Registered Tonnage (NRT)
of the ship, as well as the last foreign port the vessel called prior to entering the United States.
Tonnage fees are deposited into the General Fund of the U.S. Treasury and, within the
budget, serve as offsetting receipts for Coast Guard services provided to the international
maritime industry. The tonnage tax applied only to the first five entries a vessel makes into
the U.S. at rate of $.0.09 per NRT for vessels arriving from Western Hemisphere ports, and
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$0.27 per NRT for arrivals from all other ports. [Ref. 37:p. 67] The increase in the tonnage
tax would meet the PAYGO budgetary requirements of the BEA and the requirement for
the MSP to be budget neutral. DOT estimated that the increase in the tonnage tax would
result in an increase of $1.47 to every 20 foot container, $0.14 per ton of dry bulk goods,
$0.01 per barrel of oil, and $0.38 cents per passenger brought into the United States. Clinton
Administration officials felt the increase in the tonnage tax would be a small price to pay for
keeping ships under the U.S. flag, and for continuing some $800 million per year spent by
the Coast Guard and other agencies to provide services to all vessels calling at U.S. ports.
[Ref. 38].
In August, 1994, the House approved an amended bill (294-122) merging H.R. 2151
and the Clinton Plan into the Maritime Security Act of 1994 (H.R. 4003). H.R. 4003 was
a $1.35 billion plan that not only included funding for the MSF, but an additional $.35 billion
for shipyard financial aid in the form of loan guarantees. The House Ways and Means
Committee responded to the plan by endorsing a $1 billion dollar program, with $532 million
raised from tonnage duties, $374 million from a 1-cent-per-gallon tax on diesel fuels and $105
million from a $2 tax increase on cruise tickets. However, to pay for the MSP and Shipyard
subsidies, Chairman Studds proposed to replace the Ways and Means tax package with a
$1.35 billion increase in tonnage duties, an amendment approved by the House in hopes that
the impact on tonnage duties would be reduced in the Senate by using some portion of
defense spending to pay for the program. [Ref. 39]
Upon reaching the Senate late in the second session of the 103rd Congress, H.R. 4003
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was prevented from going through the Commerce Committee markup when opponents to the
bill employed a rarely used parliamentary rule to prevent the Merchant Marine Subcommittee
from meeting. Senator Larry Presslor, R-SD, Chairman of the Commerce Committee,
invoked a Senate rule against committees' meeting while the Senate was in session and H.R.
4003 died when lawmakers recessed in the first week of October. [Ref. 40]
The proposed tonnage tax associated with the bill came under fire from Senator
Presslor who argued for coal and grain companies and farm state interests that the higher
duties would be ruinous to their industries where the addition of a few cents per ton would
cost sales. The bill's chief supporters in the Senate, Senator Breaux and Senator Trent Lott,
R-MS, cut the proposed increase from $1.35 billion to $1 billion and ensured that grain, coal,
and other dry bulk cargoes would be exempt from the tonnage tax. [Ref. 41] However,
even this concession was not enough to persuade Presslor and other farm state Senators to
release the bill for markup. As another Congress was unsuccessful in passing new legislation
to support the Merchant Marine, Sea-Land and APL awaited Secretary Pena's ruling on their
pending applications to re-flag 20 ships.
B. 104th CONGRESS (1995-96)
In light of the failure of the previous Congress to move forward a new maritime
policy, Sea-Land and APL were granted permission by MARAD to reflag 1 1 ships early in
1995. With only two years left remaining on the majority of existing ODS contracts, the
104th Congress was faced with the possibility of a mass exodus of the remaining ships if a
new policy was not enacted by the end of its term. In an attempt to insure that the issue
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would receive early and full attention, the House National Security Committee began drafting
the Maritime Security Act of 1995 in early March, 1995. In the end, however, the 16 year
debate to replace ODS would continue until the last possible moment.
1. Maritime Security Act of 1995
The 104th Congress began under the auspices of a new Republican-controlled House
of Representative and the realignment of several committees within the House in order to
more closely match the jurisdictional responsibilities of the committees in the Republican-
controlled Senate. Under this new configuration, oversight for merchant marine affairs was
given to the House National Security Committee's Special Oversight Panel on Merchant
Marine. Within the first two months of the first session of the 104th Congress, this panel
introduced the Maritime Security Act of 1995 (H.R. 1350), a follow-on proposal to H.R.
4003. The Act was approved by the House panel in May, 1995 and passed by the full
National Security Committee one week later.
H.R. 1350's quick approval at committee level stemmed from the fact that it was
virtually the same bill as H.R 4003 with two exceptions. First, H.R. 1350 would be subject
to the discretionary spending caps established by the Budget Enforcement Act of 1990 as
amended in 1993. Funding would not be dependent on tonnage taxes but rather on annual
appropriations for MARAD from the Commerce Appropriations Bill in the amount of $100
million over a ten year period. The bill would pay shipowners $2.3-2. 1 million per vessel and
cover anywhere from 35 to 50 ships. Secondly, the bill would impose more national security
obligations on shipping lines than all previous proposals by requiring them to make available
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to the military not only their ships but also associated transportation services, which would
include terminal and handling equipment. Subsidies for shipbuilders were eliminated from this
version of the bill, as an international agreement among all Organization for Economic
Cooperation and Development (OECD) nations was reached at the end of 1994 to phase out
government aid to all participating countries' ship yards. [Ref. 42]
In a similar action, the full Senate Commerce Committee introduced and approved its
own policy version in the Maritime Reform and Security Act of 1995 (S. 1139). Sponsored
by Senator Lott, the provisions for financial aid to shipowners in S. 1 139 mirrored those of
H.R. 1350 including direct appropriations as the funding source. The change in the financing
of the bill persuaded Senator Presslor and other opponents to approve the bill in committee.
a. Funding ForMSF
Funding for the MSF was approved in early December of 1995 by the
Appropriations Conference Committee which agreed to revise FY 1996 appropriations
allocations in order to increase spending within the Commerce Appropriations Bill to pay for
additional programs including the MSF. The first year cost of the MSF was estimated at $46
million as many program participants would still be covered by existing ODS contracts that
had not yet expired. The House had included this amount in its version of the Commerce
Appropriations Act from budget authority that had been allocated earlier in the year, but had
not been used by the Energy and Water Development Spending Bill already signed into law.
[Ref. 44] The Senate proposal to pay for the MSF was to eliminate $46 million from the
$75 million Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty (RFE) account within the U.S. Information
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Agency. [Ref. 45]. The Conference Committee Report included full funding for RFE, with
the MSF funded with unused budget authority from the Energy and Water Spending Bill.
[Ref. 46] The FY 1996 Commerce Spending Bill was signed into law with the FY 1996
Omnibus Appropriations Act in April, 1997 which included four other appropriations acts.
Approved at $27.8 billion, the Commerce Bill was increased by $ 1.4 billion from the FY
1995 level, and $3.2 billion below the President's FY 1996 request of $31 billion. [Ref. 47]
Of the 1 3 FY 96 appropriation bills, the Commerce Appropriation was one of only three
spending bills to receive increased allocations from Congress, the other two being Military
Construction and the District of Columbia. [Ref. 44].
b. House Action, Senate Stalls
On December 5, 1996 the House Appropriations Committee agreed to the
Conference Committee's Commerce Appropriations Bill , and H.R. 1350 was passed by the
House on a \ i vote one day later and passed to the Senate Commerce Committee for
consideration. [Ref. 48]. Once in the Senate, H.R. 1350 was not acted on until late in the
second session, stalled by farm belt Senators led this time by Senator Charles Grassley, R-IA,
and Senate Majority Leader, Senator Robert Dole, R-KS. Notwithstanding the MSA's
change in funding from tonnage taxes to direct appropriations, Senator Grassley had long
opposed maritime programs that had included subsidies and cargo preference laws requiring
U.S. -flag carriage of certain government-influenced agricultural cargoes.
2. Maritime Security Act of 1996 Enactment
In June, 1996 Senator Dole retired from the Senate in order to devote all his time
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to his Presidential campaign. Soon thereafter, Senator Lott, Chairman of the Merchant
Marine Subcommittee and sponsor ofboth S. 1 139 and H.R. 1350, was elected by the Senate
as the new Majority Leader. Subsequently, management of H.R. 1350 was turned over to
Senator Ted Stevens, R-AK. With strong support from Senate leadership, H.R. 1350 was
presented to the full Senate on September 19, 1996. With few days left in the 104th
Congress, and not wanting to send the bill back to the House where it had left almost a year
earlier, Senator Stevens urged the Senate to reject any amendments that might force the bill
to return to the House for reconsideration. Four proposed amendments by Senator Grassley
and Senator Tom Harkin, D-IA, were tabled and the bill passed without amendment (83-10)
in its entirety on September 24. It was signed by the President as Public Law 104-239, The
Maritime Security Act of 1996, on October 8, 1996. [Ref. 49] In his support for the law
President Clinton remarked,
The Maritime Security Act will protect American jobs and maintain a
U.S. presence in international maritime trade, ensuring that vital
imports and exports are delivered in both peacetime and wartime. The
Act reaffirms our Nation's resolve to maintain a strong U.S. -flag
presence on the high -seas for our continued national security and
economic growth. [Ref. 50]
C. MARITIME SECURITY ACT POLICY ELEMENTS
A product of the Clinton Administration, Congress, and industry, the Maritime
Security Act of 1996 (MSA) amended the Merchant Marine Act of 1936 to mandate the
establishment of a fleet of active, militarily useful, privately owned vessels to meet national
defense and other security requirements and to maintain a U.S. presence in international
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commercial shipping. The MSA was authorized for a period of 10 years beginning in FY
1996 through the end of FY 2005, and reflected many of the ideas brought forward by
industry during its six years of consideration and deliberation. Additionally, the MSA differed
from the previous ODS system by directly associating the participants in the program with
national security responsibilities in exchange for financial payments.
1. Establishment of the Maritime Security Fleet (MSF)
Section two of the MSA established the guidelines for the establishment of the
Maritime Security Program, the Operating Agreements under which the vessels would be
financially compensated, the National Security Requirements placed upon participants, and
the authorization of funding for the program.
a. Vessel Eligibility
Eligibility for enrollment in the MSF required that vessels, whether in
commercial service or on charter to the Department of Defense, must be either a roll-on/roll-
off(RO-RO) vessel with a carrying capacity of at least 80,000 square feet or 500 twenty-foot
containers/equivalent units (TEU's), a Lighter Aboard Ship (LASH) vessel with a barge
capacity of at least 75 barges, or any other type of vessel that is determined by the Secretary
of Transportation to be suitable for use by the U.S. for national defense or military purposes
in time ofwar or national emergency. Additionally, vessels had to be less than 15 years of
age, with the exception ofLASH vessels which could be as old as 25 years. [Ref 50]
b. Operating Agreements
The MSA required that participants in the program enter into an operating
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agreement (contract) with the Secretary of Transportation which required that the vessel be
operated in the foreign trade of the U.S. without restriction, or in mixed foreign and domestic
trade as allowed by other provisions. Contractors of vessels were granted regulatory relief
from the previous ODS systems as they were allowed to operate their vessels without
restriction in foreign commerce.
For entering into the agreement, which would be effective for one fiscal year at a time
but renewable subject to the availability of annual appropriations each subsequent fiscal year
through the end of 2005, the operator for each vessel would receive an annual payment of
$2.3 million for FY 1996 and $2.1 million for each fiscal year there after in which the
agreement is in effect. The amount would be payed in equal monthly installments at the end
of each month and the agreement would constitute a contractual obligation of the U.S.
government. Additionally, current ODS vessels accepted into the program would not be
eligible for payment until the expiration of their existing ODS contracts. If annual funds
required by the operating agreement are not available by the 60th day of the fiscal year, then
each vessel covered by the agreement is released from the contract and may transfer and
register under a foreign flag. As the recent history of the FY 1996 Commerce Appropriations
Act proves (it was not signed until the 197th day of the fiscal year), this provision could
become significant for the future of the program. [Ref 51]
c. National Security Requirements
Within the MSA, participants in the MSF were required to enter into an
Emergency Preparedness Program agreement with the Secretary of Transportation. The
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additional agreement required that during time of war or national emergency, or whenever
determined by the Secretary ofDefense to be necessary for national security, a contractor for
a vessel covered by an operating agreement must make available commercial transportation
resources including vessels or capacity in vessels, intermodal systems and equipment, terminal
facilities, intermodal and management services, and other resources as necessary. The
agreement requires compensation for resources provided for the commercial diversion period
and allows operations or employment in foreign commerce of a foreign-flag vessel as a
temporary replacement for an activated vessel. The basic terms of the Emergency
Preparedness Agreements would be made pursuant to consultations with the Secretaries of
Transportation and Defense and the MSF contractors. [Ref 51]
2. Provisions For Preference Cargo and Future Programs
In addition to establishing the essential operating elements of the Maritime Security
Program and reducing regulatory requirements for operators, the MSA included provisions
to assist the agricultural interests that had opposed the idea of continued financial aid to the
commercial fleet. Additionally, the originators of the MSA placed new reporting
requirements on the Secretary of Transportation to ensure planning for follow on programs
and legislation to assist the U.S. merchant marine. [Ref. 51]
a. Streamlining of Cargo Allocation Procedures
Section 17 of the MSA modifies allocation requirements in provisions
concerning certain exports sponsored by the Department of Agriculture, and essentially
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reduces by 25 percent the amount of cargo that must be transported on U.S. -flag vessels.
[Ref. 51]
b. Establishment ofthe Maritime Policy Report
Section 14 of the MSA required that the Secretary transmit to Congress a
report setting forth the Department of Transportation's policies for the 5-year period
beginning October, 1995 with respect to improving the vitality and competitiveness of the
U.S. merchant marine. The report was required to be submitted with the President's FY
1997 budget. [Ref. 51] The Maritime Policy Report had not been published as ofNovember,
1997. [Ref. 52]
D. MSA IMPLEMENTATION
In October 1996 MARAD began accepting applications from shipowners for
enrollment ofvessels in the MSF. Twenty-one ship operators submitted applications for 97
vessels to enroll in the program. To select vessels for the 47 available slots, MARAD used
specific eligibility and priority ranking criteria outlined in the MSA. First priority was given
to vessels owned and operated by citizens of the U.S. and vessels less than 10 years old
owned and operated by a corporation that was either eligible for U.S. citizenship or currently
operating, managing, or chartering vessels for the Secretary of Defense. The latter half of this
provision was to designed to enable Maersk Ltd., a U.S. subsidiary of the Dutch owned A.P.
Moller/Maersk Line, to have vessels eligible for the program. At the time Maersk Ltd.
operated 22 ships under the U.S. registry, many of which were on charter to DOD. The
MSA limited the number of ships of first priority vessels per owner to the number that the
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owner operated in U.S. foreign commerce as ofMay 17, 1995, plus the number the owner
chartered to DOD as of that date. [Ref 53:p. 3] Additionally, if the number of vessels that
qualified for first priority status exceeded the number of slots available, the MSA required that
the assigning of slots would be prorated among vessel owners based on the number of first
priority vessel each owned.
From the applications submitted, MARAD determined that 53 of the 97 vessels
offered for enrollment met first priority status. Because of their military usefulness, six
additional vessels were granted age waivers to meet eligibility requirements, bringing the total
of first priority vessels to 59. Using the prorated criteria, ten owners were selected to
provide 47 ships and by the end of January, 1997, 38 ships were entered into the new
operating agreement. [Refs. 53 and Ref. 54]
Nine slots were made available for APL but not immediately filled pending APL's
negotiation ofnew labor contracts with its unions and its subsequent sale to Neptune Orient
Lines (NOL) of Singapore. [Ref 54] As a result of the sale, APL established American Ship
Management, LLC. (AMS), a new U.S. based subsidiary of APL/NOL, and requested that
its nine pending operating agreements be transferred to it. In October, 1997 MARAD
approved the transfer of APL's nine operating agreements and existing ODS contracts to
AMS [Ref. 55]. The nine MSF vessels will in turn be chartered back to APL for business
purposes. Pending the completion of the NOL/APL merger, the nine AMS vessels are
expected to be fully enrolled in the program by the end of 1997.
The composition of vessels and owners representing the MSF is displayed in Table VI.
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At the end ofFY 1997, 29 of the 47 selected ships were receiving payments in accordance
with operating agreements under the guidelines of the MSA. By the end of FY 98 it is
expected that 45 ships will be under operating agreements, with the last two ships remaining
under ODS contract until 3 1 December, 1998. [Ref 56]
MSP Contractor No. ofMSF Vessels Vessel Type
Sea-Land Service, Inc. 15 Container
American President Lines, Ltd. 9 Container
Maersk Line, Ltd. 4 Container
Waterman Steamship Corp. 4 LASH
Central Gulf Lines, Inc 3 1 Lash, 2 Car Carriers
Crowley American Transport, Inc. 3 Combination Container/RO-RO
Farrell Lines Inc. 3 Container
Lykes Brothers Steamship Co. Inc. 3 Container
First American Bulk Carrier Corp. 2 Container
OSG Car Carriers, INC 1 Car Carrier
Total 47
Table VI. MSF Composition. [Ref. 57]
E. ASSOCIATED LEGISLATION
In addition to the MSA, relief of regulatory requirements and authorization and
appropriations of funds to support the Title XI Ship Financing were provided in separate
legislative acts.
1. Coast Guard Authorization Act of 1996 (CGAA)
The 1996 CGAA, Public Law 104-239, contained several provisions reducing vessel
inspection requirements in an effort to increase the competitiveness of the commercial fleet.
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Section 1137 of the CGAA allows U.S. -flag vessels to be eligible for a certificate of
inspection if they meet international standards prior to U.S. documentation and are classed
by and designed in accordance with the American Bureau of Shipping rules, or other qualified
classification societies. Prior to this provision U.S. flag vessels were required to meet both
international standards and Coast Guard inspection requirements in order to receive a U.S.
certificate of inspection. The extra cost borne by ship operators to prepare for two
inspections was another disadvantage to the U.S. registry. The CGAA streamlined the
process, eliminating redundancy in the two standards. Additionally, the CGAA amended
requirements to allow foreign owned lease financing companies to finance certain vessels, and
eliminated U.S. -citizenship requirements for vessel mortgagees and trustees in an effort to
attract capital investment into the U.S. flagged fleet. [Ref 3:p. 22].
2. National Defense Authorization Act of 1998 (NDAA)
One ofthe shipowners' original requests in the industry proposal for maritime reform
was to eliminate the 3-year waiting period for a vessel to become eligible to carry preference
cargoes after it has been reflagged to the U.S. registry. As several MSF vessels had been
reflagged to participate in the MSP, this requirement would make them ineligible to carry
preference cargo. The NDAA amended this requirement to exempt vessels covered by a MSP
operating agreement from the restrictions concerning building and registry of a ship in a
foreign country that were previously associated with cargo preference requirements.
[Ref. 58]
70
3. Title XI Maritime Guaranteed Loan Funding
As a means to attract customers, both foreign and domestic, to U.S. shipyards Title
XI Guarantee Loan Funding was instituted as part of President Clinton's National
Shipbuilding Initiative. Previous maritime subsidy proposals had contained provisions
to authorize funding to support the Maritime Guaranteed Loan Program of Title XI.
Beginning with the FY 1993 Commerce Bill the funding for this program was separated from
vessel subsidy programs and was appropriated within the MARAD operating budget. The
FY 1996 appropriation of $40 million guaranteed up to $1B in loans. FY 1997
appropriations for this program totaled an additional $44 million, and the FY 1998 request
was for $39M. [Ref. 59]
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V. ANALYSIS OF THE MARITIME SECURITY ACT (MSA)
This chapter will examine the cost of maintaining the Maritime Security Fleet, its
associated usefulness to DOD sealift planners, and its current effect on the U.S. -flagged
merchant marine. It will analyze the final cost of the MSA and discuss its associated indirect
costs to the federal government. Then the MSA's benefit to strategic sealift will be discussed.
Finally, the chapter will address the impact of the MSA on the U.S. merchant marine.
A. FISCAL IMPLICATIONS
With the enactment of the MSA, operating payments were authorized to be payed
annually to ship operators over a 10 year period— FY 1996 to FY 2005 ~ for vessels enrolled
in the Maritime Security Program (MSP). Total payments were authorized up to $100
million annually with a final program cost of $1 billion. The estimated final cost of the MSP
is $825.35 million, considerably less than the authorized amount. The difference between
the authorized program cost and estimated program cost is explained by the late passage of
the MSA in 1996, existing ODS contracts for eight vessels ofthe MSF in effect until January
1998, and the pending sale of APL. [Ref 56]
1. Maritime Security Program: Program and Financing
First year funding for the MSP was provided in the FY 1996 Commerce
Appropriations Act in April 1 997, seven months prior to the authorization of the MSA in
October, 1997. As a result, the entire FY 1996 appropriation remained unobligated and
was available for obligation in FY 1997. Additionally, the MSA provided for payments of
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$2.3 million in FY 1996, and $2. 1 million for the remaining nine years. Because the MSA
did not come into effect until FY 1997, the payment of $2.3 million was never awarded, and
ships with operating agreements were paid at the rate of $2. 1 million beginning with the first
agreements approved in January, 1997.
While the FY 1996 appropriation remained unobligated, the FY 1997 Commerce
Appropriation provided another $54 million to the program, bringing the total budgetary
resources available for obligation in FY 1997 to $100 million. Beginning in 1997, 29 ships
received payments under the new operating agreements, incurring a government obligation
of $49 million. Of the remaining 18 ships accepted into the program, nine were covered by
ODS contracts until the end of 1997, one additional ship had not yet been re-flagged to enter
the program, and APL was in the process of bringing the remaining nine ships into the
program- reflagging its six newest and largest ships from the Marshall Islands to the United
States.
By the end ofFY 1998, 45 of the 47 vessels selected will have received payments in
accordance with the operating agreements. The remaining two vessels will come into the
program upon the expiration of their ODS contracts in January, 1998. The FY 1998
appropriation of $35.5 million and the remaining account balance of $51 million will be
outlayed in FY 1998, meeting new obligations of $86.5 million. FY 1999 will mark the first
year all 47 ships will receive payment of $2.1 million each for the entire year. An annual
appropriation of $96.75 million will be required in FY 1999 and throughout out the remaining
six years of the authorization to pay all participants. The MSA's program and financing is
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detailed in Table VII.
2. Impact of Inflation on the MSP
The authorization of payments to MSF participants does not make provisions for
inflation or increases in ship operating costs. The payment of $2.1 million is a flat flee
throughout the life of the program and constitutes a real savings of at least $95.1 million
during the program's 10 year authorization.
MSA PROGRAM AND FINANCING (in millions of dollars)
Budgetary Resources
Available for Obligation














46 100 86.5 94.5 98.7





Table VII. MSAFinam;ing. [Ref 59:p. 823
In response to Congressional inquires concerning the selection process for the MSF,
the Government Accounting Office (GAO) studied the impact of introducing a competitive
bidding process to determine the participants for the MSF. Representatives from the various
ship owning companies participating in the study indicated that if a competitive selection
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process was introduced that they would increase their annual bid proposals to account for
inflationary adjustments. Using the annual inflation forecast of two major economic
forecasting firms, Table VIII depicts the impact of inflation on the annual payment of $2.
1
million per vessel and the savings from the flat fee payment. [Ref.53:p. 6]
Impact of Inflation on Annual MSF Payment (dollars in millions)
Fiscal Year 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005
Adjusted
Payment
2.10 2.15 2.2 2.26 2.32 2.38 2.44 2.52 2.59
Annual
Savings




2.3 6.0 13.38 23.89 36.91 53.08 72.09 95.12
Table VIII. Impact of Inflation on the MSF Annual Payment. [Ref. 53: p. 6]
a. Phase Out ofODS Contracts
At the end ofFY 1997, the remaining contract authority in the ODS program
was $255 million and unpaid obligations were $291 million. Annual appropriations will
continue to be provided to the ODS program in order to liquidate remaining contract
authority, and the final contract will expire on October 18, 2001. Total vessel subsidy cost
for the period 1997-2005, including both ODS and MSA, is estimated to be $1.12 billion.
[Ref. 59:p. 823]
b. Impact ofAnnual Appropriation Process
While the MSP was appropriated at requested levels for FY 1996-1998, full
funding of the program will continue to be subject to the annual appropriations process.
While support for the program remains strong in Congress, as evidenced by the approval of
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appropriations to meet all requested funds during the first three years of the program, the
future of the program will be subject to the continued support of Congressional appropriators
and the ability of Congress and the President to approve the annual Commerce Appropriation
within the required time line as outlined in the MSA. Despite the MSP's requirement for
annual funding approval and the negative effects of a flat fee payment, the shipowner's rush
to nominate 97 ships for the 47 ship program indicates that the nominal payment of $2.1
million, coupled with the opportunity to carry preference cargo, is in fact an attractive
incentive to remain under the U.S. flag.
3. Associated Cost: Cargo Preference
In addition to the direct payment of the MSP subsidy, cargo preference laws provide
shipowners with an indirect form of subsidy. Cargo preference legislation requires that
certain government influenced cargo be carried on U.S. flag ships. Table IX displays the
recent annual cost to support cargo preference shipments by the federal government. While
cargo preference laws mandate that applicable government cargo be carried by U.S. ships at
rates "made for transporting like goods for private persons," these rates are those of U.S.-
flagged ships with inherently higher operating costs as opposed to the lowest available
shipping rate on the market. The elimination of cargo preference laws would reduce the
federal government's shipping costs; however, government outlays to foreign vessels for the
carriage of cargo would further alter the nation's balance of payments and trade deficit. In
addition to MSP payments, cargo preference laws are significantly vital to maintaining the
U.S. -flag fleet. MSP payments alone do not provide the necessary financial incentive for
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ship operators to keep their vessels under the U.S. -flag. [Ref. 17]










Department of Defense 43S/438 4X2/412 398/398 419/419
Department of Agriculture 62/49 50/38 36/70 33/55
Department of
Transportation (MARAD)
63/63 14/14 25/25 28/28
Export-Import
Bank of the U.S.
40/40 24/2 32/2 31/2
Agency for International
Development
4/4 8/8 9/9 10/10
Department of State Ml Ml Ml Ml
Total 608/595 509/475 501/505 522/495
Table IX. Cargo Preference Program Cost. [Ref. 59:p. 825]
B. NATIONAL SECURITY IMPLICATIONS
The vessels comprising the MSF provide a significant sustainment sealift capability
to DOD planners and currently fill a shortfall in DOD's requirement for 10 million square feet
of sealift capacity.
1. MSF Capabilities
The MSF is made up of 21 large containerships (carrying capacity greater than 3000
twenty-foot equivalency units (TEU's)), 15 medium containerships (carrying capacity less
than 3000 TEU's), five LASH vessels, three combination Container and RO/RO ships, and
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3 Car/Truck carriers. Their combined capacities include the capability to carry 128,661
TEU's, and 1,360,268 total square feet ofRO/RO capacity. The containerships represent
the U.S.-flagged fleet's newest ships and provide a proven source of sustainment capability.
RO/RO vessels and the motor vehicle carriers, in addition to meeting sustainment
requirements, also fill the gaps in surge capability shortfalls. Along with the ships, the MSF
provides a pool of well trained mariners to augment DOD surge sealift manning requirements.
The MSP also provides DOD with access to the participating companies' shore side
intermodal transportation systems, cargo handling systems, and cargo tracking systems as part
of the Voluntary Intermodal Sealift Agreement (VISA) included in the program.
2. DOD Sealift Requirements
At the beginning of 1997, DOD's surge sealift fleet included 95 ships with more than
7 million square feet of carrying capacity. DOD is currently in the process of procuring 19
Large, Medium-Speed RO/RO's (LMSR's) to meet its need for 10 million square feet of
sealift capacity. Congress appropriated funding for 16 LMSR's at an average cost of $314
million, and the first two vessels were delivered in the fall of 1996. [Ref 24: p. 29] The last
vessel is expected to be delivered by the end of2001 . The MSF's RO\RO's, at a cost of $2.
1
million per year, per vessel, currently provide a much sought after capability to meet the
shortfall in surge sealift capability.
DOD's sealift requirements are based on the requirement to deploy cargo to major
regional contingencies through a combination of pre-positioned ships, fast sealift ships, and
activation ofnecessary RRF ships. As the characteristics of military and commercially useful
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cargo ships have diverged over the past several decades DOD has sought to increase the size
of its own cargo fleet constructed with features to accommodate large numbers of wheeled
and tracked Army and Marine Corps vehicles. The type of vessel best suited to carry this type
of cargo is the ROYRO vessel, not commonly employed in commercial trade. Between 1996
and 1999 the Department of the Navy will spend approximately $4,331 billion on the
National Defense Sealift Fund (NDSF) to procure the remaining LSMR's and maintain the
RRF. [Ref 60:p. A-18] This amount is in addition to the $8.99 billion invested in strategic
sealift between 1981 and 1994. [Ref. 61:pp. 93-99],
The MSP is not designed to replace any portion of the NDSF or RRF requirement;
rather it's role is to compliment DOD sealift assets as a the primary source for sustainment
sealift and for additional surge capability. Its primary value to DOD planners is its
employment of skilled manpower that will be called upon in the event of an emergency to man
the 95 vessels of the RRF. As commercial ships are employed throughout the world, the very
nature of their work makes them ill suited for rapid deployment on a moment's notice. Thus
the requirement for DOD to have modern and capable pre-positioned and RRF ships able
to deploy within four days notice will not diminish.
3. Leverage of the Commercial Fleet
In an attempt to reduce the cost ofprocuring militarily useful (RO/RO) vessels, DOD
has petitioned Congress in the past for permission to buy and re-flag foreign built vessels in
order to replace older vessels and increase surge capacity in the RRF. Congress has approved
the purchase of five foreign vessels to be reconstructed as part of the LMSR program.
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However, any decision to purchase more foreign vessels for the federal government further
diminishes the national shipbuilding base.
One alternative for increasing capacity for sealift, and at the same time provide
additional work for shipyards while leveraging the existing merchant marine, is the
establishment of the National Defense Features Program. The program would build, install,
and maintain militarily useful features on commercial ships, making them more efficient in
carrying military unique materials. The relatively low cost of the program when compared to
buying ships for the sole purpose of carrying war time specific materials is a fiscally attractive
option to Congressional leaders who are continually seeking new means to stretch the utility
of shrinking discretionary spending. Additionally, the savings achieved by DOD in this area
could be applied to other procurement, specifically Ship Construction Navy (SCN) and the
purchase of 21st century combatants.
Investment in the National Defense Features program was authorized by the 1 996
National Defense Authorization Act and the first contract under this program was awarded
in September, 1997 by the Navy's Military Sealift Command to Hvide Van Ommerman
Tankers. The $4.9 million contract covers the installation and 25 years of maintenance of
four refiieling-at-sea stations on each of three commercial tankers currently under
construction. [Ref. 62] Despite these early successes of program authorization and the
awarding of the first contract, investigation into the National Defense Features program
continues, as the development of features that will provide the most benefit to the military,
and at the same time leave ships commercially useful, is a trade off in capabilities that shipping
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companies and DOD must agree on.
C. MSA EFFECT ON INDUSTRY
Prior to the passage of the MSA, 118 U.S. -flag ships were engaged in foreign
commercial trade, with 77 of them under ODS contracts at the end of 1995. Because the
MSA provides payments to only 47 vessels, and government preference cargo will continue
to decline, it is expected that the U.S. -flag fleet will continue to a shrink point where
government cargo can support the remaining unsubsidized fleet. Additionally the effects of
international mergers and consolidation will play a role in the make up of the U.S. fleet.
In February, 1997 Canadian Pacific (CP) Ships of Canada purchased the now
bankrupt Lykes Brothers Steamship Company for $34 million. CP Ships had intended to run
Lykes as a separate operating company alongside the company's two other Canadian shipping
companies, and charter the ships back to Lykes, now a subsidiary of one its creditors,
effectively keeping the ships U.S. owned and operated. [Ref 63] In August, 1997 the
MARAD Administrator, VADM Herberger, ruled against Lykes' petition to transfer its MSP
ships to CP as part ofthe sale. Even though the ships would have been operated by the U.S.
subsidiary, it was felt that the structure of the CP/Lykes agreement placed too much foreign
influence on the operations of the U.S. subsidiary employing three MSF vessels. The
Secretary of Transportation later upheld this decis' u, forcing Lykes to seek an owner for
their three MSF ships prior to their ODS contracts expiring in January, 1997.
In April, 1997 Singapore's Neptune Orient Lines (NOL) announced its intention to
buy the second largest U.S. -flagged carrier, APL, for $825 million. The acquisition of APL,
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expected to be completed by the end of 1997, will create one of the five largest container-
shipping companies in the world. NOL/APL will have a combined total of 113 vessels,
including 76 containerships with a total capacity of 200, 000 TEU's. As previously
mentioned APL's nine ships in the MSF were transferred to a U.S. subsidiary, American Ship
Management. [Ref 64]
The sale of APL and Lykes, the second and third largest U.S. flag operators
respectively, to non-U. S. entities reflects the trend in the world's maritime trades towards
the ownership and operation of ships by multinational companies. Furthermore, individual
carriers have been aligning themselves in carrier alliances on major trade routes. A direct
result of such agreements is the ability of carriers to share vessel assets and cargo capacity
with foreign companies on designated trade routes, resulting in improvements in capacity
management, increased utilization and higher freight rates.
All these events have further added to the debate over the need for a U.S. -flag
merchant marine, and the concept of expanding the U.S. merchant marine to include the
Effective US Controlled (EUSC) Fleet. EUSC vessels are owned and operated by U.S.
companies but registered in foreign countries where there is an agreement between the
registry nation and the U.S. that those vessels my be recalled by the President in times of
emergency to meet national sealift requirements. EUSC ship are owned by U.S. companies
that do represent the U.S. collective interest in international trade and in seeking cost effective
and efficient marine transportation between trading nations in an effort to attract customers
and remain profitable. Additionally, the success of these companies contributes to the
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nation's Gross Domestic Product and their income provides revenue to the U.S. in the form
of taxes. Furthermore, in the absence ofa U.S.-merchant marine, the U.S. and DOD may not
be ready to make the commitment to rely solely on foreign carriers, whether allied or friendly
nations, for all its commercial and a portion of its defense sealift requirements.
As the largest trading nation in the world, the issue of maintaining a U.S. registered
merchant marine in foreign trade is an economic one. It must consider the costs and benefits
of maintaining a nationally owned industry in a current business environment dominated by
transnational corporations benefitting from the advantages of flag of convenience registries.
At the same time, the issue of maintaining a merchant marine to support strategic sealift is
a national security one that must consider the costs and benefits of having a commercial
maritime capability to meet specific defense needs. The combination of fiscal and regulatory
policy required to maintain a merchant marine capable of meeting both missions has been
sought by government and industry leaders since the end of World War I. Today's
continually evolving maritime industry makes the government's effort to forge a single
overarching maritime policy that much more difficult.
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VI. SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS
This chapter summarizes the fiscal and national security concerns that influenced the
evolution of the Maritime Security Act of 1996 and the decision of policy makers to
continue payment of subsidies to U.S. ship operators. It then presents ideas currently being
discussed for follow-on policies and provides suggestions for further study.
A. FACTORS INFLUENCING MARITIME POLICY
During the 20th century, the U.S. merchant marine has played an essential role in
both the development ofthe U.S. as the leading trading nation in the world, and in sustaining
our armed forces during times of conflict. Since the end of World War I, the federal
government has taken an active role in developing public policy to ensure that a U.S.
merchant marine would exist to serve the nation's interests in both commerce and war. The
most influential policy in ensuring both those requirements could be met by a citizen owned
industry has been the Merchant Marine Act of 1936. Developed from the painful lessons
learned in World War I, when the U.S. found itselfwithout a sufficient sealift capability, and
the failure of maritime policy in the 1920's, the Merchant Marine Act introduced a system
of highly regulated incentive payments to shipowners as a means of offsetting the higher cost
of operating ships with U.S. citizens. Amazingly, that system, the Operating Differential
Subsidy, remained in effect for well over 60 years as the key element of the nation's policy
to maintain a merchant marine. Despite the outlay of over $10 billion since 1936, the
percentage of U.S. trade carried by the U.S. merchant marine has fallen from 24 percent in
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1955 to just over 3 percent in 1997.
1. Republican Policy: 1980-1992
In 1981, President Reagan, realizing the failure of this system to increase the
merchant marine's competitiveness and faced with the requirement to reduce government
spending, announced that his administration would not enter into new ODS contracts.
Additionally, the Reagan administration eliminated the shipyard's equivalent to the ODS
system, the Construction Differential Subsidy (CDS), further adding to the decline of the
nation's maritime industry. Meanwhile DOD and Special Commission studies concluded that
the decline of the merchant marine over the past several decades would have a dramatic
impact on strategic sealift were the nation to experience an extended conflict overseas. The
withdrawal ofmany troops from abroad made the reliance on strategic sealift that much more
important. In response to these concerns, Congress and DOD began an extensive buildup of
government owned sealift assets and the modernization of the Ready Reserve Force.
The election of George Bush as President in 1988 did little to change the nation's
policy towards its merchant marine. Despite the recommendations of the Special Commission
on Merchant Marine and Defense to continue a modified system of less regulated ODS
payments, the Bush administration also decided not to enter into new ODS contracts. The
maritime industry was deeply divided among its members on the issue of maritime reform.
Differences of opinion between subsidized and unsubsidized vessel operators, domestic and
international trade route carriers, shipowners and shipyards, and labor and management,
made it impossible for one policy to meet the needs of all interests. As long as industry
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could not come to a consensus the Bush administration was prepared to let the issue of
policy reform wait. However, the impact of Operation Desert Storm forced the issue of
reform to the forefront of the congressional agenda as the importance of a commercial
maritime capability was highlighted by the deployment of troops and supplies halfway around
the world in preparation for war.
In response to lessons learned from Desert Storm and pressure from both industry
and Congress, the Bush Administration introduced the Maritime Reform Act of 1992 in the
102nd Congress. The Bush proposal provided benefits to all areas of the maritime industry
and introduced the concept of a Contingency Retainer Program for militarily useful
commercial ships as the follow-on subsidy system to ODS. Introduced late into the session
of Congress and combined with the fact that DOD and DOT could not agree on certain
aspects ofthe bill, the proposal never made it as far as the House or Senate floors for debate.
2. 103rd and 104th Congress
Following the failure of the 1992 Reform Act to make any progress in Congress, the
two largest U.S. -flagged carriers, Sea-Land and APL, announced their intention to seek
foreign registries for their ships if a new policy could not be agreed upon. Building upon a
combination of the Bush proposal and an industry "wish" list, a new reform proposal was
introduced by members of the House and later combined with President Clinton's own
proposal to form the Maritime Security and Trade Act of 1994. This act was the first
proposal introduced to be funded with new revenues to the government — increased tonnage
taxes. Much like previous bills, this plan also assisted shipyards with subsidies and new
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guaranteed loans. The bill was passed by the House but died in the Senate when concerns
about the tonnage tax and its effects on other domestic industries prompted farm state
Senators to hold it in committee until Congress had adjourned.
With less than three years remaining on the majority of existing ODS contracts, the
104th Congress moved quickly to introduce a plan that would successfully meet fiscal
constraints, enhance defense sealift capabilities and increase the commercial competitiveness
of the industry. Benefitting from the worldwide movement of OECD nations to eliminate
government subsidies from shipyards, the Maritime Security Act of 1995 was the first
proposal introduced with no ties to shipyard financial aid. Additionally, the 1995 bill
replaced the financing mechanism of previous attempts with a proposal for an annual
appropriation of $100 million authorized over a ten year period. The bill was eventually
passed in the final days of Congress as the Maritime Security Act of 1996, and established
a 47 ship Maritime Security Fleet (MSF) to be provided with annual payments of $2. 1 million.
B. IMPACT
In the end, the MSA was a policy that met the "lowest common denominator" of all
parties affected by a U.S. merchant marine and its associated costs and benefits. As a new
discretionary program the MSA was subject to the fiscal constraints of the spending caps
imposed by the BEA of 1990. Additionally, as depicted in Appendix C, the program was
gradually scaled down over time to incur the least cost to the federal government while
gaining the services of the commercial fleet's newest and most militarily useful ships. In
addition to the ships, DOD received the insurance of access to the vast transportation
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infrastructures of the companies involved in the Maritime Security Program, and an
employment base of several thousand skilled and actively employed mariners.
Despite the many threats of industry to re-flag vessels over the past six years, there
was no shortage of ships seeking acceptance into the MSF. With payments authorized for
only 47 ships, as compared to 77 ships under the previous ODS system, it can be expected
that the commercial fleet will gradually decline over the next few years as the final-ODS
contracts expire. Ironically, the company with the most ships represented in the new subsidy
program, Sea-Land, has never been the recipient of direct subsidies. During the MSA's
consideration and subsequent enactment, Lykes Lines, the third largest U.S. carrier, filed for
bankruptcy, and APL, the second largest carrier, was purchased by a liner company from
Singapore.
Six years in the making, the MSA was hurriedly passed at the end of the 104th
Congress under the assumption that failure to do so would result in large scale re-flaggings.
As evidenced by the history of the MSA and the Merchant Marine Act, any policy associated
with the maritime industry has wide ramifications and will require long and deliberate
considerations. The MSA was not the overhaul of policy that many in industry had hoped
for, and based on its scope and time limit, it appears to be a short term policy that has
temporarily halted the decline of a beleaguered industry. The follow-on policy to MSA, if
there is to be one, will likely come under even more scrutiny as Congress continues to
reduce discretionary spending in an effort to balance the budget.
As international competition continues to shape the world's maritime industry into
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a business dominated by transnational corporations, mergers and alliances will continue to
erode the concept of a national merchant marine. This trend towards multinational ownership
has influenced the debate on the need to maintain a national commercial fleet. The nation's
requirement for a national fleet governed by strict U.S. regulations and high taxes is not
conducive to the success of U.S. commercial ships in the international market without some
form of financial incentive for shipowners. It has been difficult for the U.S. government to
achieve and sustain a maritime policy for the commercial fleet which meets the differing
requirements for commerce and national security.
C. SUGGESTIONS FOR FURTHER STUDY OF FOLLOW-ON POLICIES
In order to assist companies operating U.S. -flagged ships to compete in international
trade many experts in the industry have recommended that the federal government adopt
regulations that mirror those of competing nations. These ideas include the adoption of an
Open Registry concept, where only a certain portion of crews would have to be U.S. citizens,
and ships would be required to meet only international standards. Several European nations
have adopted similar policies in an attempt to return previously flagged ships now under flag
of convenience registries back to their original countries. Examination of the effects of such
a policy would prove beneficial in the development of our nation's follow-on attempt to the
MSA.
Other ideas include amendment of the federal tax code to accelerate depreciation
schedules ofU.S. ships, exempt wages of U.S. seamen from federal income tax, and provide
tax deductible business expenses to companies that ship cargo on U.S. flag ships.
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Additionally, making capital venture investments in U.S. flag companies tax exempt might
make investing in the U.S. merchant marine more attractive and draw more shippers into the
industry. Opposition to these ideas will easily be raised, as questions are asked concerning
the propriety of giving one industry preferential treatment. However, it is at least worth
considering the benefits and costs of enacting legislation that would further reduce the cost
of operating under the U.S. -flag, bringing it more in line with international competition.
While the issue of finding the cure for the ailing shipping industry as a whole is quite
complex, the problem of maintaining a reserve force of trained and skilled mariners to man
sealift ships has been under serious debate for some time and requires further investigation.
For the last several years MARAD and DOD have been studying the concept of a Merchant
Marine Reserve to ensure available manpower to man RRF ships. Would the cost of such
a program be less than subsidizing entire companies to remain U.S. -flagged? Mariners in the
program could possibly keep their training current through periods of sailing in activated
RRF ships, or employment under certain foreign flag registries if tax benefits were extended
to their reduced salaries. Additionally, if government owned assets were permitted to carry
cargo normally reserved for cargo preference carriers, would the cost of actively operating
more RRF ships and the new jobs associated with them be less than the combined costs of
subsidies, cargo preference, and maintenance of an inactive RRF? This concept might also
improve readiness as ships would not be placed in a reduced operating status. This would
essentially be the federalization of the merchant marine, as recommend by the Black
Commission in 1936.
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In the end, due to the disadvantages of competing in an international industry as the
nation with the highest standards of performance and living enjoyed by its citizens, the
decision to maintain a commercial merchant marine for either economic and/or security
reasons will require a continued investment of federal resources to offset the lower costs of
foreign competition. The size of our merchant marine will depend on how much we are
willing to spend, either in the form of direct payments or reduced regulations. The issues
affecting the merchant marine are ones that should be understood by DOD and DON planners
as the health of the nation's commercial merchant marine impacts national security and
mobility readiness.
92









Panama 119,150 1 3,948 1
Liberia 97,405 2 1,595 3
Greece 48,486 3 879 8
Cyprus 39,841 4 1,474 5
Bahamas 37,654 5 963 7
Malta 31,628 6 1,114 6
Norway 29,115 7 621 12
China 23,411 8 1,512 4
Singapore 23,409 9 742 9
Japan 21,554 10 741 10
United States2 18,021 11 498 15
Hong Kong 13,828 12 223 29
Philippines 13,256 13 530 13
India 11,420 14 306 24
All Other 189,297 11,618
Total 717,617 26,764
1 Oceangoing merchant ships of 1,000 gross tons and over.
2




APPENDIX B. MARITIME SUBSIDY OUTLAYS- 1937-1997
Fiscal Year CDS Reconstruction CDS Total CDS Total ODS TotalODS/CDS
1936-1955 $248,320,942 $3,286,888 $251,607,830 $341,109,987 $592,717,817
1956-1960 129,806,005 34,881,409 164,687,414 644,115,146 808,802,560
1961 100,145,654 1,215,432 101,361,086 150,142,575 251,503,661
1962 134,552,647 4,160,591 138,713,238 181,918,756 320,631,994
1963 89,235,895 4,181,314 93,417,209 220,676,685 314,093,894
1964 76,608,323 1,665,087 78,273,410 203,036,844 281,310,254
1965 86,096,872 38,138 86,135,010 213,334,409 299,469,419
1966 69,446,510 2,571,566 72,018,076 186,628,357 258,646,433
1967 80,155,452 932,114 81,087,566 175,631,860 256,719,426
1968 95,989,586 96,707 96,086,293 200,129,670 296,215,963
1969 93,952,849 57,329 94,010,178 194,702,569 288,712,747
1970 73,528,904 21,723,343 95,252,247 205,731,711 300,983,958
1971 107,637,353 27,450,968 135,088,321 268,021,097 403,109,418
1972 111,950,403 29,748,076 141,698,479 235,666,830 377,365,309
1973 168,183,397 17,384,604 185,568,001 226,710,926 412,278,927
1974 185,060,501 13,844,951 198,905,452 257,919,080 456,824,532
1975 237,895,092 1,900,571 239,795,663 243,152,340 482,948,003
1976 233,826,424 9,886,024 243,712,448 386,433,994 630,146,442
1977 203,479,571 15,052,072 218,531,643 343,875,521 562,407,164
1978 148,690,842 7,318,705 156,009,547 303,193,575 459,203,122
1979 198,518,437 2,258,492 200,776,929 300,521,683 501,298,612
1980 262,727,122 23,527,444 286,254,566 341,368,236 627,622,802
1981 196,446,214 11,666,978 208,113,192 334,853,670 542,966,862
1982 140,774,519 43,710,698 184,485,217 400,689,713 585,174,930
1983 76,991,138 7,519,881 84,511,019 368,194,331 452,705,350
1984 13,694,523 13,694,523 384,259,674 397,954,197
1985 4,692,013 4,692,013 351,730,642 356,422,655
1986 (416,673) (416,673) 287,760,640 287,343,967
1987 420,700 420,700 227,426,103 227,846,803










Total $3,569,648,434 $264,904,682 3,834,553,116 10,233,750,822 14,089,477,798
1 1997 ODS Total is based on OMB estimate. [Ref. 3:p. 80]
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